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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON LABOR AND CORPORATE FINANCE
Jessica S. Jeffers
David K. Musto
This dissertation consists of two chapters that relate labor issues and corporate finance.
In the first chapter, I investigate the impact of restricting labor mobility on two compo-
nents of growth: entrepreneurship and capital investment. To identify the mechanism, I
combine LinkedIn’s database of employment histories with staggered changes in the en-
forceability of non-compete agreements that come mostly from state supreme court rulings.
Stronger enforceability leads to a substantial decline in employee departures, especially in
knowledge-intensive occupations, and reduces entrepreneurship in corresponding sectors.
However, these shocks increase the investment rate at existing knowledge-intensive firms. I
estimate a state of median size gains $50 million in capital investment from publicly-held
knowledge-intensive firms, but loses almost 200 small firms entering knowledge-intensive
sectors.
In the second chapter, I explore a specific mechanism through which corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR), and in particular pro-employee policies, may benefit companies. I propose
that socially responsible behavior generates public goodwill toward the firm, which can
be redeemed when the company needs public approval, such as when applying for pub-
lic contracts. To provide causal support for this mechanism, I use the staggered state
passage of Other Constituency (OC) laws, which allow directors to orient policies toward
non-shareholder constituents. Following the passage of OC laws, employee safety and health
measures systematically improve, indicating more employee-oriented behavior. At the same
time, firms incorporated in these states systematically become more likely to obtain public
contracts and obtain contracts of higher value.
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CHAPTER 1 : THE IMPACT OF RESTRICTING LABOR MOBILITY ON
CORPORATE INVESTMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
1.1. Introduction
Recent research and policy proposals have renewed the debate over labor mobility restric-
tions, defined as provisions that prevent workers from leaving their employers (The White
House, 2016). On the one hand, limiting mobility can dampen innovation and regional
growth (Saxenian, 1994; Gilson, 1999). On the other hand, limiting mobility may have a
positive impact on existing firms. In particular, an ex-ante agreement for the employee
not to leave the employer may foster growth by safeguarding the employer’s investment,
especially where search frictions or learning on the job make it difficult to replace human
capital (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999; Zingales, 2000).
Thus mobility, in theory, trades the benefit of reallocating labor to more productive ventures
against the cost of dampening investment at existing firms. The objective of this paper
is to empirically document and quantify this bidirectional effect. Specifically, I estimate
the impact of restricting labor mobility on two ways of exploiting growth opportunities:
entrepreneurship, and capital investment. These outcomes are of particular interest for two
reasons. First, new firm entry is a key ingredient of economic growth, yet the startup rate
of new businesses has declined in recent decades, including in high-tech sectors (Decker
et al., 2014). Second, business investment is an important source of productivity growth
and has been uneven since the crisis (Furman, 2015). Studying the impact of labor mobility
restrictions is therefore important because it can help shed some light on these trends.
Examining the above trade-off presents two key empirical challenges. First, it requires a
strategy to address the potential endogeneity of mobility with respect to economic outcomes.
Short of randomly assigning mobility restrictions to employees, this means finding a source
of variation in labor mobility that is otherwise uncorrelated with capital investment and
entrepreneurship. Second, it calls for observing mobility for a large and diverse set of
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workers, as well as information on their employment before and after moving.
To address the first challenge, I focus on a particular restriction on labor mobility, covenants
not to compete (CNCs). CNCs are contract provisions that preclude employees from moving
to, or establishing, a competitor for a period of time after leaving their employer. I rely
on state-level variation in the enforceability of these contracts to tackle the endogeneity
concern. Specifically, I use a novel identification strategy based on seven state supreme
court rulings and one law that modified the enforceability of CNCs between 2008 and
2014. Court rulings provide a particularly useful empirical setting because courts are not
subject to lobbying and other pressures in the way that legislators are, alleviating worries
of a political explanation.1 Indeed I find no evidence that the changes are anticipated
or otherwise systematically associated with different types of workers, firms or political
and economic environments in a way that would bias the results. Moreover, CNCs affect
mobility for a large number of workers: Starr et al. (2016a) estimate that 18% of all labor
force participants are currently subject to a CNC, with rates as high as 35% among tech
workers and engineers. Thus CNC enforcement changes are not only an interesting setting
in which to analyze mobility generally, but are important events themselves.
For the second challenge, measuring labor mobility, I also use a novel data source: the
detailed de-identified employment histories of LinkedIn members.2 A key advantage of
these data is the presence of standardized position-level information such as occupation and
seniority. This allows me to pinpoint workers and firms for which CNCs matter the most,
namely those engaged in and relying on knowledge-intensive activities (Starr et al., 2016a).
Moreover, I observe company-level information such as industry, year founded and size both
before and after an employee move. As a result I am able to isolate moves to competitors
and to new and small businesses, thus identifying departures to entrepreneurship. Another
important advantage is that the data encompass a wide range of workers in all fifty states
1I find similar results when limiting the analysis to court rulings only.
2In 2015, LinkedIn awarded access to its database to a small number of researchers selected through a
competitive process called the Economic Graph Challenge, of which I was a winner. The data contain no
name information and numerical member identifiers in the data were hashed.
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and foreign countries. Looking only at active LinkedIn members, I observe employment
paths for 52 million workers in the U.S., or roughly one-third of the U.S. workforce.3,4 I use
founded years in company pages to capture the entry of new firms, in particular small new
firms in knowledge-intensive industries.
I establish the internal validity of my approach by verifying that CNC enforcement has
a significant impact on labor mobility. In my setting, an increase in CNC enforceability
leads to a 2.6 percentage point drop in the departure rate. This drop is economically large,
representing 24% of the average departure rate of 10.8%. The median firm retains 17 more
workers every year, relative to the median size of 649 employees. As expected, declines are
particularly pronounced for within-industry departures, and for departures to more senior
positions, which proxy for moves that build on previous experience. I further focus on a
subsample of knowledge-intensive occupations which I call “knowledge workers.” Because
of the knowledge involved in their occupations, the mobility of these workers is both more
likely to be restricted by CNCs and to be costly to firms (Starr et al., 2016a). Indeed, I
find that departure rates in these occupations are particularly affected by increases in CNC
enforceability.
I estimate the economic impact of these changes in labor mobility by considering two sets
of outcomes. First, I examine the impact of CNC enforceability on capital investment. If
human capital is hard to replace and its relationship with physical capital is complementary
– for example, expensive computers are worth acquiring if the firm can retain talented
programmers – then tighter restrictions on labor mobility will increase the rate of capital
investment. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that in firms that are more highly
dependent on human capital, the net capital investment rate rises. Knowledge-intensive
firms increase investment by $5-9k for every $100k of capital, or $1.5-2.5 million for the
median firm. This represents roughly $100-150k per marginal retained worker. For the
median U.S. state, this translates to about a $50 million aggregate increase in capital
3According to the BLS, the size of the U.S. labor force was 158 million by the end of 2015.
4Active members are defined as members who have logged into LinkedIn in the past month.
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investment coming from these firms.
Second, I analyze the consequences of mobility restrictions for entrepreneurship. I approxi-
mate experienced departures to entrepreneurship by counting departures to newly founded
small businesses. I find that departures from knowledge-intensive firms to small new firms
decrease by 0.65 following stronger enforceability of CNCs. This represents a large drop,
32%, relative to the average departures to entrepreneurship captured in my sample. In
turn, entry of small knowledge-intensive firms declines by 16%. I use the Census Bureau’s
Business Dynamics Statistics to gauge the new firm entry coverage rate of my data, which
I discuss in more detail in the paper. For the median state, I estimate 195 fewer small
knowledge-intensive firms enter the market.
The results stand up to a range of robustness analyses. Throughout, I include industry-year
fixed effects to account for industry conditions year to year, and firm fixed effects to allow
for different firm-specific baselines whenever applicable. However, we may be concerned
that unobserved local conditions drive both court rulings and mobility and investment
outcomes. To address this I show that my findings are robust to including state-year fixed
effects whenever possible – e.g., when I compare knowledge-intensive firms to the rest of the
sample in a triple differences setting.5 Similarly, I consider the possibility that a different
representation of firm types (size, R&D intensity, investment) in different states could drive
the results. My findings are unchanged when I interact year fixed effects with each of these
observables, to allow for trends along these dimensions. Finally, I show that the responses
I document occur after the court rulings, and are not anticipated, by breaking out the
difference estimate by years from CNC enforcement change.
This paper contributes to three literatures. First, this paper builds on questions raised by
Zingales (2000) about corporate finance in the context of firms’ increasing dependence on
human capital, and picked up in a small but growing literature relating frictions in human
5In the difference-in-differences specification, I cannot include state-year fixed effects because they would
absorb the treatment indicator. In the triple differences specification, state-year fixed effects absorb the
treatment indicator, but not the treatment interacted with the subsample.
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capital to firm value (Chen et al., 2011; Eiling, 2013; Donangelo, 2014). More specific to
my context, a few studies have begun relating these frictions to capital decisions (Autor
et al., 2007; Garmaise, 2011). Garmaise (2011) finds that the capital expenditure to labor
ratio decreases after CNCs become more enforceable in three states. In contrast, I find in a
more recent context that investment increases with CNC enforcement, and argue that this
is due to complementarities between human and physical capital in knowledge-intensive
firms. Moreover, I build on this by quantifying the trade-off with entrepreneurship. My
findings support the argument that control rights over human capital are a critical compo-
nent of the theory of the firm, insofar as they influence whether investment opportunities
are exploited within existing firms or as new ventures (Zingales, 2000). More broadly, this
paper contributes to research on the drivers of capital investment and of entrepreneurship.
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Second, other papers studying the relationship between CNCs and employee departures
include Marx et al. (2009) Marx (2011), Garmaise (2011), Lavetti et al. (2014), and Starr
et al. (2015). 7 However, empirical work has been hampered by endogeneity concerns and
a lack of detailed employee data on a large scale (Barnett and Sichelman, 2016). My paper
proposes a novel identification strategy using staggered rulings in recent state supreme court
cases, and uses a unique data set covering millions of employment histories to show these
rulings systematically led to lower entrepreneurship in knowledge sectors. In the process,
I also provide evidence that the impact of CNCs applies to a broad range of occupations,
albeit with greater impact in knowledge-intensive sectors. Recently, Starr et al. (2016a)
and Starr et al. (2016b) have advanced our understanding of CNCs by surveying labor force
6Other frictions which may influence investment include financing constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988; Cleary,
1999; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997), agency frictions (Jensen, 1986), short-termism (Graham et al., 2005;
Ladika and Sautner, 2016; Edmans et al., 2013), corporate governance (Wurgler, 2000; John et al., 2008),
costs and price uncertainty (Zeira, 1990), and access to public markets (Sheen, 2011; Asker et al., 2015; Gilje
and Taillard, 2016). Other factors which may drive entrepreneurship are venture capital access (Samila and
Sorenson, 2011), entrepreneurial clusters (Chatterji et al., 2013), and government policies (Hombert et al.,
2014; Pfeiffer and Reize, 2000; Hellmann, 2007; Landier, 2004). At the level of the parent firm, knowledge
transfer (Gompers et al., 2005; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Anton and Yao, 1995), financial distress (Babina,
2015), and compensation structure (Carnahan et al., 2012) constitute relevant factors.
7Babina (2015), Matray (2014) and Samila and Sorenson (2011) also reference CNCs, but only indirectly.
5
participants on the frequency and use of CNCs. I use their findings on CNC prevalence to
define knowledge-intensive occupations.
Finally, this paper contributes to the discussion on labor mobility and business dynamism
(Decker et al., 2014) by investigating a particular factor that impedes the reallocation of
human resources in the economy. I show CNC enforcement has a large impact on firm
entry, but also present a potential drawback of limiting CNC agreements. Quantifying this
trade-off is particularly important in light of recent proposals to limit the use of CNCs at
both the state and federal levels. While the intention is to spur dynamism, policy makers
appear to ignore the potential impact on existing firms (The White House, 2016). In fact in
my setting, mobility restrictions generate substantially higher capital investment at existing
knowledge-intensive firms. CNCs are thus a form of private ordering, and any government
intervention into this arrangement must justify reallocating resources from one set of agents
(e.g. existing firms) to another set of agents (e.g. entrepreneurs). 8
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 explains the CNC policy
setting. Section 2.2 describes the data. Section 2.3 outlines the hypotheses and empirical
approach. Section 2.4 presents the main results, and section 1.6 covers robustness. Section
2.6 concludes.
1.2. Empirical Setting: Covenants Not to Compete (CNC)
A covenant not to compete (also known as a non-compete agreement, hereafter CNC) is a
contract provision between an employer and an employee that precludes the employee from
working for a competitor, usually for a limited time and space after separating from the
employer.
8Justifications could include inefficient externalities generated by the arrangement, or other frictions such
as asymmetric information between the agents. I leave these questions open to future research.
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1.2.1. Prevalence of CNCs
In a survey of more than 11,000 U.S. labor force participants, Starr et al. (2016a) find
that 38% workers have at some time signed a CNC, and that 18% are currently subject
to one. CNCs are more common for more knowledge-intensive occupations: They estimate
that 39% of college-educated workers and those earning more than $100k have CNCs, and
35% of those in architecture, engineering or computer and mathematical occupations are
currently subject to a CNC. Senior employees and in particular executives are also more
likely to be subject to CNCs: Garmaise (2011) finds evidence of CNCs for top executives
in 70% of the public companies he examines. Nonetheless, CNCs are prevalent across the
board: Almost one in 10 employees without a Bachelor’s degree and earning less than $40k
annually is subject to a CNC (Starr et al., 2016a). Anecdotally, news organizations from the
Wall Street Journal to the Washington Post and the Atlantic have reported on the increased
prevalence of CNCs over the past 15 years, including in relatively unskilled positions such
as sandwich-maker.9
1.2.2. CNC Enforceability
CNCs are governed at the state level, and there is wide variation across states in the type
of CNCs that are permitted and how they are enforced. At one extreme, California bans
the use of CNCs. At the other extreme, several states allow enforcement of CNCs even for
employees who are laid off. Bishara (2011) identifies six broad dimensions of enforcement:
whether a state statute exists, the employer’s protectable interests, the plaintiff’s burden of
proof, whether CNCs can apply to terminated employees, consideration, and modification.
Consideration refers to the requirement in contractual law that both parties must receive
something in order for a contract to be valid. In the case of CNCs, many states consider
continued employment in and of itself to be sufficient consideration; others require any new
CNC or CNC amendment to be paired with a material benefit to the employee, usually a
9The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 2, 2016, “Noncompete Agreements Hobble Junior Employees”; The
Washington Post, Feb. 21, 2015, “The Rise of the Non-compete Agreement, From Tech Workers to Sandwich
Makers”; The Atlantic, Oct. 17, 2014, “How Companies Kill Their Employees’ Job Searches”.
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promotion (Starr, 2016b).
Modification, also called reformation or blue/red pencil doctrine, refers to the way in which
courts deal with overly broad restrictions. To illustrate this, Kenneth J. Vanko, an Illinois
attorney who maintains a blog on CNC law, provides a useful example. Consider the
following fictional CNC:
“Employee agrees not to work in any sales capacity for any business competitive
with the Employer for a period of six months in the following Illinois counties:
Cook, DuPage and Kane.”
Suppose the court considers this agreement overly broad because the employee only sold
to customers in Cook County, and the agreement includes DuPage and Kane counties.
If the state does not allow for any form of modification, that means the CNC is simply
unenforceable. The court cannot modify it to apply only to Cook County. If the state
allows a blue pencil approach, the court may strike out portions of the agreement to make
it enforceable, though they may not make other changes. So in this case, they can strike out
DuPage and Kane counties to make the agreement enforceable. However, if the employee
worked in product development rather than sales, the court cannot use the blue pencil to
modify the prohibited activity (“any sales capacity”). They would need a “red pencil”,
or reformation, to modify the language to match the occupation.10 A consequence of the
reformation approach is that employers have an incentive to draft CNCs as broadly as
possible, knowing that an overly broad contract will not disqualify their case but that it
may dissuade employees from a broader range of activities (Thomas et al., 2014).
Building on these six dimensions identified by Bishara (2011), Starr (2016b) constructs an
index of CNC enforceability for 1991 and 2009. In Table 4, I show that treated and control
states were at similar levels of CNC enforceability in 2009.
10The example and full discussion are available at http://www.non-competes.com/2009/01/quick-state-
by-state-guide-on-blue.html
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1.2.3. Changes in Enforceability
CNCs are governed by both statute and precedent, meaning that a case is determined by
both the law that the state has in place, and the rules established by the state’s highest
court. Table 1 outlines the CNC enforcement changes that I use for my empirical setting.
I identify seven state supreme court decisions between 2009 and 2013 by combing through
practitioner blogs and verify all cases using Westlaw.11 For each case, I also verify what local
attorneys wrote about the expected impact of the decision. If the decision took place in the
last three months of the calendar year, I assign the following year as the relevant first year
of change. Court decisions are retroactive in the sense that they affect the enforceability of
CNCs entered into before the decision was issued, as well as new CNCs.
Two states merit further note. In Illinois, the state supreme court’s decision to expand
the scope of business interests in Reliable Fire Equipment v. Arredondo et al was followed
the next year by an appellate court decision (which the state supreme court declined to
revisit) that decreased the enforceability of CNCs. To reflect this, I code Illinois as an
increase in 2012 but no longer an increase in 2013.12 In Montana, the decision concerns the
applicability of CNCs to terminated employees and is therefore a more narrow change. I
verify that my results are robust to excluding Montana.
Finally, during my sample period, Georgia passed a law allowing modification. Laws may be
more likely anticipated or lobbied for than court decisions, creating a setting in which the
outcome variables of interest are possibly endogenous to the shock. The statute change is
not retroactive: employers must secure new CNCs with their employees in order to benefit
from modification. While there is no evidence of pre-trends in my outcome variables for
Georgia, I also verify that all of my results are robust to removing the state.
11The highest court in a given state is not always called the supreme court, but in the states I discuss
state supreme court is equivalent to state high court.
12For a discussion of this reversal, see The National Law Review, Oct. 22 2013, “Non-Compete Agreements:
Lessons from Illinois Courts.”
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1.2.4. State Supreme Court Composition
Table 2 shows the composition of the state supreme courts for these states. On average,
the courts are composed of seven justices serving terms of 10 years. Of these, only the
Montana, Texas and Wisconsin justices face contested re-election. They were on average six
years from re-election at the time of their decisions, suggesting their rulings were unlikely
to be affected by immediate re-election concerns. In Colorado and Illinois, justices face
uncontested retention re-elections, and in South Carolina and Virginia, justices are re-
appointed by the state’s general assembly. In these four states justices were on average
seven years from re-appointment at the time of their decisions.
The “treated” states constitute a geographically and economically diverse group of states.
Figure 1 shows the geographic location of these states. In Section 2.3, I show these states
are similar to the control states in terms of ex-ante political and economic characteristics.
In untabulated results I also verify that trends in these dimensions are similar in the treated
and control group in the years leading up to the decisions.
1.2.5. Impact on Mobility
The main mechanism by which we expect CNC enforcement to dissuade labor mobility
is deterrence, but this can manifest itself in several complementary ways. First, higher
enforceability can mean that there are more cases brought to court, and more cases where
an employee is found to be at fault, which can discourage employees uncertain about leaving.
Figure 2 shows that since 2008, courts have decided 900-1,000 CNC cases every year. This
number does not include cases that were settled, not to mention disputes that did not reach
courts. Second, employees who seek legal advice about a potential move will be counseled
differently following a change in enforceability. For example, following Illinois’ decision in
Reliable Fire, attorneys may counsel employees that the risk of litigation for a CNC breach
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has increased.13 Third, employers can and do remind workers of their obligations.14 Fourth,
prospective employers refrain from hiring workers who are likely subject to CNCs.15 Fifth,
in the case of modification, employers have incentives to draft broader CNCs going forward
(Thomas et al., 2014). Finally, there could be a peer effect as well: As fewer colleagues
move to or establish a new firm, this could reduce the impetus for an employee to follow
that path.
I assign firms to the state in which most employees reside, according to LinkedIn. If deter-
rence is the main mechanism through which enforcement impacts employee mobility, what
matters is the environment to which employees are exposed. For prosecution of CNCs, the
relevant jurisdiction is typically the place of performance of the economic activity, though
where the contract was formed and the parties reside may also enter into consideration
(Lester and Ryan, 2010).
1.3. Data
1.3.1. LinkedIn data
In 2015, LinkedIn selected a small number of researchers to be part of the Economic Graph
Challenge, an initiative to harness LinkedIn’s data to gain new economic insight. As a
winner of the challenge, I was granted access to detailed de-identified data from LinkedIn’s
platform. The data contain no name information and numerical member identifiers in the
data were hashed.
LinkedIn is an online professional networking platform, which began in 2003 and has since
grown to over 450 million users worldwide. For this paper, I use employment histories for
active members in the U.S., i.e. employees who have been on the site in roughly the past
13The National Law Review, Dec. 9 2011, “Illinois Supreme Court’s Decision in Reliable Fire Broadens
Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants.”
14See Kenneth Vanko’s blog, www.non-competes.com, Dec. 31 2010. “It is fairly standard now for any
departing employee to receive a not-so-friendly reminder from an ex-employer about the terms of a non-
compete agreement.”
15For an example, see The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 2, 2016, “Noncompete Agreements Hobble Junior
Employees.”
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month. About 52 million employment histories fall into this category during my sample
period, or roughly one third of the US workforce.
Users’ profiles are essentially online CVs, listing where they have worked and in what
capacity, as well as where they went to school and other interests. These are the data
which I use to track employee movements. Note that an individual did not have to be a
LinkedIn member in a given year to have employment information for that time. LinkedIn
standardizes employer information, so that users are made to select an existing employer if
at all possible. Standardized employer information includes industry, year founded, size and
employer type (e.g. private company, government entity). The platform also standardizes
position-level information such as occupation and seniority level. This information allows
me to further focus on within-industry moves, as well as pinpoint employees in knowledge-
intensive occupations.
I match firms in LinkedIn to publicly-held firms in the Compustat database in order to
observe firm investment, and to link to observable characteristics such as size and NAICS
industry. Figure 3 shows the coverage of LinkedIn by sector for this matched sample. I
calculate the ratio of active members employed in each sector in 2014 to the number of
employees reported on Compustat for the same firms. The aggregate coverage rate is 30%.
The figure indicates that my sample over-represents knowledge-intensive sectors. However,
that is precisely the population in which I am most interested. First, these sectors represent
occupations that are most likely to be affected by CNCs (see Figure 5). Second, companies
which employ knowledge workers likely depend more on human capital for their production
function.
We may be concerned that individuals lie about their past employment history. However,
unlike lying on a resume that only a prospective employer will see and cannot easily verify,
lying on a LinkedIn profile is publicly visible. That public accountability makes it more
difficult for individuals to make false claims about their employment. Alternatively, we may
be concerned about individuals who forget to update their profile. For this reason I use data
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only from active members. Moreover, the data come from a 2016 snapshot of employment
histories, which leaves time for individuals to have updated their 2008-2014 employment
histories, particularly if they are active on the site.
An individual counts as employed at company A in year t if she lists a job at company A at
any time during year t. She is considered as a departure in year t if she is no longer employed
at company A in year t+1. The departure rate of a firm is its number of departures scaled
by its employee size. I use the Compustat number of employees rather than the LinkedIn
count of employees to scale departures, in order to avoid any biases that could come from
LinkedIn disproportionately representing employees in transition. Results are similar if I
use LinkedIn number of employees as the denominator instead.
Table 3 Panels A and C contains summary statistics for the departure analyses at the firm-
year level. In Panel A, all variables are scaled by the same number of employees, so the total
departure rate is mechanically higher than all other departure rates. The average departure
rate is 10.80% (median 4.37%), and the average knowledge worker departure rate is 4.8%
(median 1.63%). In other words, knowledge workers represent about 40% of all departures.
Panel C shows unscaled firm-level departure numbers to newly founded firms. The sample
is slightly bigger than in Panel A because the Compustat employee variable is not required
to be populated. For the average firm-year in my sample, 1.56 LinkedIn members leave to
a newly founded firm with 50 or fewer employees (median 0).
I also use LinkedIn company pages to measure the entry of new firms. Using year founded,
location, industry and size, I create an industry-state panel of new firms founded. I restrict
the data to private companies to avoid capturing spin-offs and mergers. Since these are
private firms, I use the industry classification provided within LinkedIn, which contains
roughly 130 unique industries.16 To make numbers comparable across states, I scale the
number of newly founded firms by population. In Table 3 Panel D, I show summary statistics
16Not all industries are represented in all states. For the typical state there are 94 unique industries
represented in the new firm data.
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for both scaled and unscaled observations, for easier interpretation. The average number
of firms of any size entering per year per industry is 2.53, while the median is 1. Notably,
the number of small firms entering is not much lower, confirming that the data are not
capturing disproportionately large firms.
1.3.2. Investment data
I use Compustat data to measure the investment response of firms. To avoid bias from
mergers or acquisitions, I exclude firm-year observations with more than 100% growth in
sales or assets. I also remove financial and regulated industries, and exclude observations
with missing stock market data.
I define net investment as capital expenditures less the sale of property (Compustat capxv -
sppe), and scale by one year-lagged net capital (Compustat ppent) to obtain the investment
rate, I/K. I winsorize the top and bottom 1% and exclude observations with less than 0.5
million in net capital. These steps are to ensure that my sample is focused on the most
relevant observations and that my estimates are not driven by outliers, but my results
are robust to less stringent cleaning as well. I choose to scale investment by net capital
because I think of the firm’s decision on investment opportunities as occurring in each
period, conditional on the depreciated stock of capital. However, results are qualitatively
similar when I scale by gross capital or assets instead.
Table 3 Panel B presents summary statistics for this sample. The average net capital
investment rate is 0.30, and the median 0.22.
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1.4. Hypotheses and Empirical Approach
1.4.1. Hypothesis Development
Labor Mobility and Firm Investment
Consider a typical firm with two inputs to production: physical capital and human capital.
Workers become more valuable to the firm as they gain more tenure, either because they
learn firm-specific expertise on the job, or because they gain general skills and search fric-
tions make replacement difficult (or both). In this case, making it easier for employees to
leave reduces tenure and, as a result, the accumulation rate of human capital. Moreover,
it can be hard to properly gauge the quality of prospective hires. If that is the case, high
turnover can also increase uncertainty about the quality of human capital tomorrow. An
alternative way to frame this is to think of the depreciation rate of human capital. In
the setting I propose, decreasing labor mobility (increasing CNC enforceability) is akin to
lowering the average and volatility of the depreciation rate of human capital, because hu-
man capital accumulates more quickly and the quality of human capital tomorrow is less
uncertain.
We expect the firm’s investment into human capital to increase, because returns to this
investment go up when workers are leaving less readily. However, the impact on investment
into physical capital depends on whether the two inputs are complements or substitutes. If
physical and human capital are complementary – say, because expensive equipment requires
skilled labor to operate – then physical capital investment will increase with the stability of
human capital. If they are substitutes – say because the tasks performed by human capital
can be automated – then physical capital investment will decrease with labor mobility.
As this example highlights, it is possible that the nature of the relationship between
both inputs depends on the type of human capital. Specifically, occupations that are less
knowledge-intensive may be easier to automate, and thus have lower complementarity with
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physical capital than more knowledge-intensive occupations, such as engineering or design.
Not coincidentally, CNCs are more common in occupations that are knowledge-intensive,
since their goal is to preserve valuable human capital. Figure 5 shows the incidence of
CNCs by occupation from Starr (2016a). I expect firms that employ more workers from
high-CNC occupations to have a greater positive response to CNC enforcement increases,
both because they are more likely to employ CNCs and because their human capital may
be less substitutable.
Labor Mobility and Entrepreneurship
Just as CNCs preclude individuals from moving to a competitor, they preclude individuals
from establishing a competitor. Thus in a very direct sense, an increase in the enforceability
of CNCs should preclude some individuals from leaving to join or start a new firm. However,
the impact on overall firm entry is less direct. For example, it could be the case that
investment opportunities no longer pursued by employees subject to CNCs will be seized by
individuals not limited by these agreements (e.g. college students). At the same time, most
entrepreneurship emanates from ideas encountered in previous employment (Bhide, 1994),
and experienced entrepreneurs tend to be more successful (Franco and Mitchell, 2008).
This supports the hypothesis that new firm entry will also decline in response to stronger
enforceability of CNCs. Finally, I expect more knowledge-intensive firms to have a greater
response because they are more likely to be concerned by changes in the enforceability of
CNCs.
1.4.2. Methodology
I use a generalized difference-in-differences approach with CNC enforcement changes as my
treatment of interest. The specification is as follows, for company i in industry j, state s
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and year t:
yijst = α+ β(treateds ∗ postt) + γi + θjt + ijst
where treatedi ∗ postt is 1 for an increase in enforceability relative to 2008, 0 for no change,
and -1 for a decrease in enforceability.17 I include company fixed effects γit and industry-
year fixed effects θjt in all regressions, with industry defined as four-digit NAICS code. I
cluster all errors at the state level. I do not include time-varying firm controls such as firm
size, because such controls may be affected by the treatment. If that is the case, including
these controls would result in inconsistent estimates of the treatment effect. However, in
unreported analysis I find similar results when include log market capitalization, assets, and
employee size.
The main assumption underlying this approach is that absent the CNC enforcement changes,
the average change in the treated and control groups would have been the same (the two
groups would have experienced parallel trends). The coefficient estimate on treatedi ∗ postt
captures the additional change in treated states, relative to untreated states, following a
change in CNC enforcement.
In Figure 4, I show that there was no anticipation or differential trend between both groups
prior to the treatment, in terms of departures. I estimate the following equation:
departure rateijst = α+
∑
k
βk(treateds ∗ k years to treatment) + γi + θjt + ijst
Figure 4 plots a time series of the coefficient estimate on treateds ∗ k years to treatment
against k years to treatment . Prior the enforcement change, the estimated difference be-
tween the treatment and control groups is virtually zero. However, following the change in
enforcement, the departure rate in the treatment group drops significantly relative to the
17I make this symmetric assumption for convenience. Most of the changes that I use have a similar
weight in the enforceability indexes constructed by Starr (2016b) and Bishara (2011), so this seems to be
reasonable. An exception is Montana, where the court ruling affects only terminated employees. However,
since relatively few firms are located in Montana, this is not a driver of my results.
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departure rate in the control group.
In Table 4, I compare relevant characteristics for eventually treated and control observations,
prior to the start of my sample. Having the same ex-ante levels of observables is not a
necessary condition for the identifying assumption – trends can be at different levels as long
as they are parallel – but similar ex-ante characteristics reinforce the assumption that the
average change in both groups would have been the same absent treatment. There are four
columns of statistics in Table 4. The first shows the ex-ante mean for states in which CNC
enforcement does not change in my sample period (Never Treated). The second shows the
ex-ante mean for all states in which CNC enforcement changes during the sample period
(Eventually Treated). I then break this group into two groups, based on whether CNC
enforcement increases or decreases. The last group contains relatively few observations,
as only Montana and South Carolina experience decreases in the enforceability of CNCs.
Results are robust to excluding these two states.
Looking at local political and economic conditions, treated and control states are not statis-
tically different, although Montana and South Carolina have lower average GDP per capita
and are more conservative than the rest. States in which CNC eventually increases are very
similar to control states. Although not shown, trends in GDP growth, GDP per capita
and unemployment rate are also similar between both groups. The same pattern emerges
when looking at measures of mobility and firm characteristics. Observations for which CNC
enforceability eventually increases are very similar to control observations. Observations in
Montana and South Carolina have a lower departure rate, though it is not statistically
different. They are smaller in terms of market capitalization and larger in terms of employ-
ees. I verify that results hold when I exclude South Carolina and Montana observations.
Moreover, in Section 1.6 I verify that results are robust to allowing for different trends by
market, asset and employee size.
Finally, using Starr et al. (2016a) I separate out occupations that are most likely to be
affected by CNCs. Figure 5 reproduces the incidence of CNCs by occupation found in
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their survey. I call individuals in the highest CNC occupations knowledge workers. They
encompass the following occupations within the LinkedIn classification: arts & design,
business development, consulting, education, engineering, entrepreneurship, finance, infor-
mation technology, media & communication, operations, product management, program &
project management, and research. Knowledge workers represent close to half of the work-
ers for the average firm in my sample. Knowledge firms are firms which employ a greater
than median fraction of knowledge workers. I use this classification and high R&D intensity
as ways to proxy for firms that are more dependent on human capital.18
1.5. Results
1.5.1. Employee Mobility
To verify that CNC enforcement impacts mobility, I first look at departure rates to de-
termine whether CNCs have an impact on employee mobility. Table 5 shows results from
a difference-in-differences regression of departure rate on an indicator for increased CNC
enforceability. The sample universe is public companies matched between LinkedIn and
Compustat. Following an increase in CNC enforceability, the departure rate drops by 2.6
percentage points, which represents 24% of a 10.8% average departure rate. While large,
this number is consistent with survey evidence from Starr et al. (2016b).19 As expected,
this effect is pronounced for within-industry moves, which drop by 1.4 percentage points
relative to a 3.6% average within-industry departure rate. To better focus on voluntary
departures, I look at employee moves where the next position is at a higher seniority level.
Again, increased enforceability of CNCs leads departures to more senior jobs to decrease
substantially, by 85 basis points relative to an average rate of 2.68%. This is even more
pronounced when I focus on within-industry departures to more senior positions, which
drop by 31 basis points relative to an average rate of 0.78%.
18More than 50% of R&D is wages paid to research activities (Hall and Lerner, 2010), suggesting R&D
intensity is a reasonable proxy for a firm’s dependence on skilled human capital.
19In their survey of over 11,000 labor force participants, they find that the projected departure rate to a
competitor is about 2.5 percentage points, or 20% lower for individuals who are subject to CNCs.
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In Table 6, I show that these results are driven by workers in knowledge occupations by
estimating difference-in-difference-in-differences (or “triple differences”) regressions. These
regressions compare the impact of higher CNC enforceability on all occupations to the
impact on the subsample of occupations that Starr et al. (2016a) identify as more prone
to CNCs. The coefficient estimate on treated*post*knowledge worker represents how much
more knowledge occupations respond to the CNC enforcement changes. For all categories,
this estimate is negative. It is strongly statistically significant for overall, within-industry,
and “to more senior job” departure rates, though not for the last, most narrow category,
which counts only departures to more senior positions within the same industry.
Taken together, these results indicate an important economic impact of increased CNC
enforceability. For an average firm size of 4,044 employees, 2.6 percentage points represent
106 individuals. Since firm size is right-skewed, a perhaps more relevant statistic is that
the median firm with 649 employees retains about 17 workers more than it would have
otherwise.
1.5.2. Firm Response
Having established that CNC enforceability represents a shock to human capital mobility, I
turn to the firm’s investment response. In Table 7, I show that tighter restrictions on labor
mobility consistently lead to a higher investment rate. Following the discussion in Section
1.4.1 and the results in Section 1.5.1, I expect that the response will be more pronounced
in firms that are more dependent on specialized human capital. To test this, I run two
triple differences using different proxies for knowledge-intensive firms: firms with a higher
than median fraction of knowledge workers (knowledge firms), and firms with a higher than
median R&D intensity.
The results show that I/K increases substantially with CNC enforceability, and that this
is driven by firms that are more dependent on specialized human capital. Specifically, the
results indicate that overall, firms increase investment by $6k for every $100k of net capital.
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For knowledge firms, the estimate is $9k for every $100k of net capital, and for firms with
high R&D intensity, $5k (additional to other firms). At first, the effect appears extremely
large: Comparing to the average investment rate, the coefficient estimates imply an increase
of 21%. In knowledge firms, the estimated additional increase is 26% relative to an average
I/K of 0.35, and in high R&D intensity firms it is 17% relative to an average I/K of 0.32.
This suggests a direct elasticity with departure rates, which experience an approximately
commensurate relative decrease (24%). However, the estimates are best understood in an
economic context. Multiplied by the average net capital stock, the estimates indicate $17
million increase in investment in knowledge firms and a $12 million increase in high R&D
intensity firms. Put differently, the median knowledge firm increases investment by $2.6
million, and the median R&D intensive firm by $1.6 million.20
Relating back to the results in 1.5.1, this is equivalent to roughly $93-164k per marginal
retained worker, whether we use averages or medians. These estimates seem to be within a
reasonable magnitude when we take into account the replacement cost of skilled employees.
At an aggregate level, my sample contains 83 knowledge firms and 104 high R&D intensity
firms in states which experience an increase in CNC enforcement. Multiplied by the aver-
age estimated investment increase per knowledge-intensive firm, this implies an aggregate
increase of $1.3-1.4 billion in investment from publicly-held knowledge-intensive firms in
those states. For the median U.S. state, it represents a $50 million increase.
1.5.3. Entrepreneurship
If knowledge firms gain in investment opportunities, what happens to growth opportunities
outside of the firm? One of the main costs to CNCs cited in the literature is that fewer
experienced employees leave to start their own businesses. This is especially important if
firms started by experienced, skilled employees tend to be more successful than other new
firms (Franco and Mitchell, 2008).
20The median net capital for knowledge firms is $28.49 million, and for high R&D firms is $29.88 million.
The average net capital is $192 million for the former and $229 million for the latter.
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I proxy for entrepreneurship by looking at departures to newly founded, small businesses.
Specifically, a business is new if it is founded within a year in either direction of the em-
ployee’s departure. Founded year comes from LinkedIn company pages, as does firm size.
Firm size does not depend on the number of employees present on LinkedIn, but is a cate-
gory on the company’s page. A limitation of this approach is that I observe only the latest
size: any company that has grown significantly since it was founded will not be captured
as small.
In Table 8, I look at the total number of departures to newly founded businesses in three
categories: 1-10 employees, 1-50 employees, and all sizes. I look at total departures rather
than departure rates in this analysis because I am interested in the overall impact on
entrepreneurship rather than the firm’s loss. I focus on departures from knowledge firms as
in the previous section and following the discussion in Section 2.3. Results are similar in a
difference-in-differences where the left hand side is total departures of knowledge workers.
The results suggest that an increase in CNC enforceability is particularly discouraging
for workers from knowledge firms leaving to start or join small new firms. Indeed, the
coefficient estimates suggest an incremental 40% fewer departures to new firms with 10 or
fewer employees and 32% fewer departures to new firms with 50 or fewer employees, relative
to averages of 1.05 and 2.03 departures in those categories for knowledge firms. In Section
1.5.1, I estimated that the median firm retained an incremental 17 workers (106 on average).
The estimates here indicate that about up to 4% of these marginal retained workers also
did not become entrepreneurs.
In Table 9, I turn to the number of new businesses founded per industry-year. Again, I
find a more pronounced effect in knowledge sectors, defined here as firms in technology,
professional, scientific and technical services, or education.21 I scale by state population to
make the numbers comparable, but this makes estimates difficult to interpret directly. In
relative terms, the estimates suggest that the knowledge sector experiences an 11% decrease
21I use Starr et al. (2016a) as a reference for industries in which CNCs are more frequently used.
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in new firms entering with 10 or fewer employees and a 16% decresase in new firms entering
with 50 or fewer employees, following higher CNC enforceability. To better understand the
economic interpretation of the results, I break them out by sector in Table 10, for new firms
with 50 or fewer employees. New small firm entry declines 6% in the technology sector,
12% in professional, scientific and technical services, and 27% in education. Multiplied by
the number of industries in each sector, the estimates imply 5, 13, and 2 fewer new firms
in my sample (for each sector in turn) per 10 million people. However, this very likely
underestimates the total impact on new firm entry, since my sample only captures private
firms for which I observe year founded on LinkedIn.
As a point of comparison, I download the number of opening establishments for new firms
from the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) database of the Census. The comparison
is meant as a back-of-the-envelope calculation. It is imperfect because I am comparing
establishments to firms (the database does not provide the count of new firms, only estab-
lishments belonging to new firms), and because other aspects of the datasets do not line up
exactly. Nonetheless, if we assume most new firms have a limited number of establishments
in their first year and are willing to make other assumptions, this serves as a useful reference.
BDS statistics are aggregated in broad sectors, including an “education and health services”
sector and a “professional and business services” sector. None of the other sectors line up
with the technology sector, so I infer a coverage rate from the professional and business
services sector comparison. According to the BDS, about 11,000-15,000 establishments be-
longing to new firms in the education and health services sector opened each year between
2008 and 2014, in the treated states. For professional and business services, this number
was 15,000-19,000. In contrast, 200-300 new education and health services firms entered
my LinkedIn sample each year during the same period, and 700-1,100 new professional,
scientific and technical services firms did the same.
Overall, I estimate a coverage rate of about 5% for the latter group (and by extension,
for the technology sector), and a coverage rate of about 3% for the former. In turn, this
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suggests that for every 10 million people the total impact of increased CNC enforceability
would be 103 fewer new technology firms, 251 fewer new professional services firms, and
82 fewer new education firms. Aggregated over states in my sample which experienced an
increase in CNC enforceability, this represents 2,900 foregone entrants. For the median
state with 4.5 million individuals, this represents 195 fewer small firms entering knowledge
sectors. Relative to the estimated $50 million investment increase for the median state, this
would place the trade-off at $250,000 in investment per non-entrant.
1.6. Robustness
1.6.1. State-Year Fixed Effects and Size Trends
One potential concern is that unobservable local economic or political trends differed in
states that experienced CNC enforcement changes, relative to states that did not. To
address this concern I repeat my investment and departures to entrepreneurship analysis
with state-year fixed effects. This is possible because I am comparing results for knowledge-
intensive firms to results in the overall sample in a difference-in-difference-in-differences
setting. By including state-year fixed effects, I am identifying the response of knowledge-
intensive firms in a given state relative to non-knowledge-intensive firms in the same state.
State-year fixed effects absorb the treated ∗ post indicator.
Table 11 reports the result of these regressions for firms’ investment response. Whether
knowledge-intensive firms are identified as knowledge firms or high R&D intensity firms,
the estimate on increased CNC enforceability is positive and statistically significant at a 90%
confidence level. The estimated magnitudes are lower than in Table 7, but still relatively
high: for the average firm, the estimates indicate an $11 million increase in investment, and
for the median firm, a $1.5 million increase. The implied investment per marginal retained
worker remains around $100k.
Table 12 reports the results for departures to entrepreneurship. The coefficient estimates
for departures to new small firms remain negative and statistically significant. The point
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estimates are slightly lower than without state-year fixed effects, but remain high, repre-
senting about a 35% decrease relative to average for departures to 50 or fewer and 10 or
fewer new firms. In turn, Table 13 shows that estimates are largely unchanged when I add
state-year fixed effects to the triple differences regression with new firm entry.
In Table 14, I also show that investment results are not driven by differential trends for
firms with high market capitalization, asset size, employee size, or investment rate. The
classification for each firm is, of course, static for the sample period. The point estimates
remain very similar to the results in Table 7, indicating that differential trends are not a
driver of these results.
1.6.2. Years to CNC Change
To verify that the results are driven by the CNC enforcement changes, I estimate the coeffi-
cient on treated∗post separately for each year from the CNC enforcement change, including
one year prior to the change. Tables 15-18 present the estimates of these regressions for my
main results. The omitted years are two or more years prior to the CNC enforcement change,
to allow for enough observations to be in the omitted category as a comparison point. I
pool observations more than three years post change, since only Wisconsin observations can
fall into that category.
The results show no evidence that differences between the treated and control groups pre-
ceded the CNC enforcement changes in any of the situations. For departure and investment
rates, the point estimates change sign in the year of the change but become statistically
significant one year following an enforcement change. The estimates for departures to en-
trepreneurship also become statistically significant in t+1, yet the impact on new firm entry
appears to be statistically significant from t+0. This could be explained by the fact that
entrepreneurs sometimes wait until their venture is off the ground before quitting their “day
job.”
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1.7. Conclusion
Recent research and policy proposals have renewed the debate over labor mobility restric-
tions. In particular, one issue that has received a lot of attention is the enforcement of
covenants not to compete (CNCs), mostly for its potentially negative effects on knowledge
spillovers and entrepreneurship (Samila and Sorenson, 2011; Matray, 2014). However, CNC
enforcement may be an important tool for firms to safeguard capital investments. Estab-
lishing and quantifying this trade-off is especially important in light of recently proposed
regulation (The White House, 2016) that appears to miss the latter effect.
In this paper, I consider the impact of CNC enforceability on two outcomes: entrepreneur-
ship and capital investment. To address concerns about unobservable differences biasing
cross-sectional results, I identify a series of recent state supreme court rulings that changed
the enforceability of CNCs in various states. I combine these with detailed data on employee
movements from LinkedIn’s wide-reaching database of employment histories. This allows
me to pinpoint workers in knowledge-intensive occupations, as well as departures to newly
founded small businesses to capture entrepreneurship.
I find that changes in the enforceability of CNCs lead to substantial effects on both en-
trepreneurship and investment. The effects are particularly pronounced in knowledge-
intensive occupations, where the average departure rate drops by a quarter. The median
knowledge-intensive firm increases its investment rate by an estimated $2-2.5 million annu-
ally. At the same time, the rate of entry of new, small firms in knowledge sectors declines
by 16% relative to average.
These results point to an important trade-off of labor mobility, between encouraging the
entrance of new firms on the one hand and investment at existing firms on the other hand.
While the magnitudes are difficult to quantify, my estimates place the trade-off at around
$50 million in capital investment against 200 foregone small entrants for a state of median
size. A limitation of this study is that I cannot quantify the value of the marginal new
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firms or of the marginal investment, and I cannot capture all welfare-relevant outcomes.
Nonetheless, this paper contributes to the existing literature by painting a more complete
picture of labor mobility and policies that regulate it, and opens the door for future inquiries
to refine quantitative estimates of the trade-offs involved.
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Figure 1: Map of CNC Enforcement Changes
Figure 2: Trade Secret and CNC Litigation from Beck, Reed & Riden, LLC
Source: Beck, Reed & Riden, LLC, Jan. 11 2016
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Figure 3: LinkedIn Coverage by Sector
This figure presents an estimated coverage rate for firms in my LinkedIn-Compustat merged sample. I divide my
sample firms by Global Industrial Classification (GIC) sector, and take the total count of individuals employed in
each sector according to LinkedIn in 2014, divided by the count of employees from Compustat in 2014.
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Figure 4: Difference in Departure Rate by Years to Treatment.
This figure presents the coefficient estimate βk from the equation below, against years to treatment k. The estimate
represents the difference in departure rate between the treated and control observations, before and after the change
in enforcement of CNCs.
100 ∗ # departures
# employees it
= α+
∑
k
βk{treatedi ∗ k years to treatment}+ γi + θjt + it
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Figure 5: Incidence of CNCs by Occupation from Starr et al. (2016)
This figure comes from Starr et al. (2016a). In this paper, I consider knowledge workers to be those in the right-most
occupations, starting from Life, Physical, Social Sciences.
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Table 1: CNC Enforcement Changes
State Case
Enforcement
Direction
Nature of Change
Wisconsin
Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal
Pra. (2009)
↑ Supreme Court allows
modification
South
Carolina
Invs, Inc. v. Century
Builders of Piedmont,
Inc. (2010)
↓ Supreme Court rejects
modification
Colorado
Lucht’s Concrete
Pumping, Inc. v. Horner
(2011)
↑ Supreme Court allows
continued consideration
Texas Marsh v. Cook (2011) ↑
Supreme Court changes
requirements on business
interests
Montana
Wrigg v. Junkermier
(2011)
↓
Supreme Court rejects
application to terminated
employees
Illinois
Fire Equipment v.
Arredondo et al (2011)
↑ Supreme Court expands the
scope of interests
Illinois
Fifield v. Premier Dealer
Services (2013)
↓ Supreme Court restricts
standards
Virginia
Assurance Data Inc. v.
Malyevac (2013)
↑ Supreme Court reduces
automatic dismissals
Georgia 2011 ↑ Legislature allows modification
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Table 2: Composition of State Supreme Courts
State Composition Appointment
Mean Years
from
Term End
Colorado
7 justices who serve
10 year terms
Uncontested retention elections
after initial appointment
5.25
Illinois
7 justices who serve
10 year terms
Uncontested retention elections
after initial contested partisan
election
5.57
Montana
7 justices who serve 8
year terms
Nonpartisan election 4.17
South
Carolina
5 justices who serve
10 year terms
Elected and re-appointed by SC
General Assembly
8.00
Texas
9 justices who serve
10 year terms
Partisan election 6.00
Virginia
7 justices who serve
12 year terms
Elected and re-appointed by VA
General Assembly
9.40
Wisconsin
7 justices who serve
10 year terms
Nonpartisan election 6.57
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for key variables. In Panel A, I include all observations for the sample
of LinkedIn firms merged with Compustat, including for firms in financial, regulated and construction
industries, and observations with missing stock market or asset data. The only requirement is that the
Compustat employee variable is not missing, to define the departure rate. In Panel B, I exclude firms in
financial, regulated and construction industries, as well as observations with missing stock market or asset
data, because that portion of the analysis focuses on net investment rate. In Panel C, the sample is the
same as for Panel A, without the requirement that the employee variable be populated. In Panel D, the
observations are at the industry-state level, the number of newly founded firms in LinkedIn. The sample
period for all is 2008-2014.
Variable Obs Mean SD 25% 50% 75%
Panel A: Departure Analysis
Departure rate 9,479 10.80 138.98 1.56 4.37 9.69
Within-industry departure rate 9,479 3.59 56.20 0.24 1.00 2.74
Knowledge worker dep. rate 9,479 4.84 63.96 0.41 1.63 4.12
Dep. rate to more senior job 9,479 2.68 41.52 0.20 0.86 2.20
Dep. rate to more senior job within ind. 9,479 0.78 15.09 0.00 0.08 0.45
Employees 9,539 4,044 13,374 157 649 3,087
Panel B: Investment Analysis
Market cap. ($M) 5,053 1,925 4,860 77 371 1,384
Assets ($M) 5,053 1,544 4,008 80 303 1,219
Employees 4,956 3,613 7,671 250 933 3,500
I/K 5,053 0.30 0.29 0.11 0.22 0.39
Knowledge firms 5,030 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
High R&D firms 5,029 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00
Panel C: Departures to Entrepreneurship Analysis
Departures to new 1-10 emp. 9,785 0.84 4.91 0 0 1
Departures to new 1-50 emp. 9,785 1.56 8.68 0 0 1
Departures to new all sizes 9,785 3.25 29.78 0 0 2
Panel D: New Firm Entry Analysis
New firms 1-10 emp. 31,850 1.94 6.38 0.00 0.00 2.00
New firms 1-50 emp. 31,850 2.50 8.84 0.00 1.00 2.00
New firms all sizes 31,850 2.53 8.95 0.00 1.00 2.00
New firms 1-10 emp., p. million 31,850 0.29 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.31
New firms 1-50 emp., p. million 31,850 0.36 0.87 0.00 0.09 0.36
New firms all sizes, p. million 31,850 0.37 0.88 0.00 0.10 0.37
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Table 4: Ex Ante Sample Characteristics
This table reports means of observables for observations in states where CNC enforcement does not change,
and for observations in states where CNC enforcement changes at some time during the sample period.
Below the means are p-values from a t-test of differences relative to the “never treated” observations. I
break out the latter into observations for which CNC enforcement eventually increases (Colorado, Georgia,
Illinois, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin) and those for which it eventually decreases (Montana, South Carolina).
Macroeconomic measures and firm characteristics cover the two years before my sample starts, 2006-2007.
For firm level characteristics, I cluster standard errors by state and drop the top and bottom 1% outliers.
I take the Partisan Voting Index from the 2010 Cook Political Report, and the CNC enforceability score
from the 2009 index constructed in (Starr, 2016b). Mobility measures are taken from 2008 only due to data
limitations.
Eventually Treated
Never Treated All Increase Decrease
Political & Economic Measures
GDP growth, in pct 5.35 5.64 5.24 6.87
p = 0.698 0.893 0.302
GDP per capita, in thsds USD 48.24 44.53 47.50 35.63
p = 0.453 0.896 0.201
Unemployment rate, in pct 4.44 4.45 4.33 4.80
p = 0.969 0.724 0.495
Partisan Voter Index R+2.4 R+3 R+1.5 R+7.5
p = 0.864 0.821 0.451
CNC enforceability score 0.12 -0.03 0.12 -0.46
p = 0.717 0.995 0.480
Mobility
Departure Rate 6.72 6.77 6.90 2.10
p = 0.961 0.856 0.299
Departures to New 1-50 Emp. 1.11 0.85 0.86 0.33
p = 0.440 0.465 0.727
New Firms 1-50 Emp., p. million 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.22
p = 0.742 0.402 0.334
Firm Characteristics
Market Cap. ($M) 1,428 1,592 1,614 1,028
p = 0.591 0.555 0.023
Assets ($M) 864 1,183 1,196 833
p = 0.155 0.151 0.736
Employees 2,802 3,509 3,469 4,469
p = 0.257 0.298 0.000
I/K 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.32
p = 0.268 0.270 0.308
Knowledge firm indicator 0.47 0.38 0.38 0.44
p = 0.220 0.212 0.696
High R&D intensity indicator 0.67 0.53 0.52 0.67
p = 0.099 0.094 0.936
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Table 5: Employee Departure Rate
The dependent variable is the firm’s departure rate in year t in percentage points (1 to 100). In Column
(1), the numerator is all departures. In Column (2), the numerator includes only departures where the
origin and destination industries are the same. In Column (3), the numerator includes only departures to
a more senior position. In Column (4), it includes only departures to a more senior position, in the same
industry. The denominator is the same throughout, so each outcome variable has a different baseline average
– mechanically, the number is highest in Column (1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
state level. Industry is 4-digit NAICS.
100 ∗ # departures
# employees it
= α+ β{treatedi ∗ postt}+ γi + θjt + it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Departure
Rate
Within-
Industry
To More
Senior Job
Within-Ind.
More Senior Job
Treated*Post -2.612*** -1.409*** -0.849*** -0.309***
(0.845) (0.460) (0.248) (0.0948)
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Company FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 9,479 9,479 9,479 9,479
R-squared 0.964 0.963 0.94 0.975
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Employee Departure Rate by Occupation
The observation level is occupation-firm-year. The dependent variable is the firm’s departure rate in year
t in percentage points (1 to 100). In Column (1), the numerator is all departures. In Column (2), the
numerator includes only departures where the origin and destination industries are the same. In Column
(3), the numerator includes only departures to a more senior position. In Column (4), it includes only
departures to a more senior position, in the same industry. The denominator is the same throughout, so
each outcome variable has a different baseline average – mechanically, the number is highest in Column (1).
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. Industry is 4-digit NAICS.
100 ∗ # departures
# employees imt
= α + β1{treatedi ∗ postt ∗ knowledge workersm}
+ β2{treatedi ∗ postt}+ γi + λsm + θmt + imt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Departure
Rate
Within-
Industry
To More
Senior Job
Within-Ind.
More Senior
Treated*Post*Knowledge Worker -2.536*** -2.048*** -1.430*** -0.423
(0.540) (0.515) (0.362) (0.284)
Treated*Post 0.988 0.532 -0.513 -0.946
(1.243) (1.227) (1.196) (1.230)
Company FE Y Y Y Y
State-Occupation FE Y Y Y Y
Occupation-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 311,202 311,202 311,202 311,202
R-squared 0.422 0.404 0.405 0.481
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Net Investment Scaled by Capital
The dependent variable is net investment scaled by one year-lagged net capital. In Column (1), the regression
is a difference-in-differences with all observations pooled. In Columns (2)-(4), the regression is a difference-
in-difference-in-differences, or triple differences. In Column (2), the subsample is the set of firms which
employ an above-median fraction of knowledge workers. In Column (3), it is the set of firms with an above-
median R&D intensity. In Column (4), it is the set of firms in knowledge industries. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the state level. Industry is 4-digit NAICS.
I
K it
= α+ β1{treatedi ∗ postt}+ β2{treatedi ∗ postt ∗ subsamplei}+ γi + θjt + it
(1) (2) (3)
I/K I/K I/K
Treated*Post 0.0633** 0.0147 0.0256
(0.0283) (0.0223) (0.0265)
Treated*Post*Knowledge Firm 0.0900**
(0.0347)
Treated*Post*High R&D Intensity 0.0530*
(0.0281)
Industry-Year FE Y N N
Subsample-Industry-Year FE N Y Y
Company FE Y Y Y
Observations 5,053 5,030 5,029
R-squared 0.603 0.641 0.620
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Departures to Entrepreneurship
The dependent variable is the number of departures from a given firm to newly-founded companies. In
Column (1), this includes only companies with 10 or fewer employees. In Column (2), this expands to
companies with 50 or fewer employees, and in Column (3) this includes newly-founded companies of any
size. Knowledge Firm is an indicator for firms with a higher than median fraction of knowledge workers.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Industry is 4-digit NAICS.
departuresit = α+ β1{treatedi ∗ postt ∗ knowledge firmi}+ β2{treatedi ∗ postt}+ γi + θjt + it
(1) (2) (3)
New ≤ 10 Employees New ≤ 50 Employees New All Sizes
Treated*Post*Knowledge Firm -0.421** -0.652** -14.38
(0.176) (0.265) (13.23)
Treated*Post 0.0737 0.157 13.63
(0.0813) (0.243) (13.59)
Knowledge Firm-Ind.-Year FE Y Y Y
Company FE Y Y Y
Observations 9,785 9,785 9,785
R-squared 0.917 0.927 0.400
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: New Firm Entry
The dependent variable is the number of companies founded within an industry-state-year, scaled by the
state’s population in millions. In Column (1), this includes only companies with 10 or fewer employees. In
Column (2), this expands to companies with 50 or fewer employees, and in Column (3) this includes newly-
founded companies of any size. Knowledge sector is an indicator for firms in the following three sectors:
professional, scientific and technical services, technology, and education. Standard errors are clustered at
the state level. Industry is LinkedIn-defined industry.
firms founded
million people sjt
= α+ β1{treateds ∗ postt ∗ knowledge sectorj}+ β2{treateds ∗ postt}+ γsj + θjt + sjt
(1) (2) (3)
New ≤ 10 Employees New ≤ 50 Employees New All Sizes
Treated*Post*Knowledge Sectors -0.0325* -0.0590** -0.0626**
(0.0189) (0.0232) (0.0245)
Treated*Post -0.00263 -0.000370 0.000343
(0.00590) (0.00610) (0.00560)
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y
Industry-State FE Y Y Y
Observations 31,850 31,850 31,850
R-squared 0.714 0.767 0.768
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: New Firm Entry in Knowledge Sectors
The dependent variable is the number of companies 1-50 employees founded within an industry-state-year,
scaled by the state’s population in millions. In Column (1), I focus on the subsample of industries in
the technology sector, in Column (2) on industries in professional, scientific and technical services, and in
Column (3) on industries in the education sector. Column (4) includes all other industries. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. Industry is LinkedIn-defined industry.
firms founded 1-50 emp.
million people sjt
= α+ β{treateds ∗ postt}+ γsj + θjt + sjt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Technology Prof, Sci. & Tech. Education All Other
Treated*Post -0.0388** -0.0737* -0.0769* -0.000370
(0.0176) (0.0414) (0.0412) (0.00610)
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry-State FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,753 6,090 924 20,083
R-squared 0.814 0.811 0.511 0.540
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: I/K Analysis With State-Year FE
The dependent variable is net investment scaled by one year-lagged net capital. In Column (1), the subsample
of interest is the set of firms which employ an above-median fraction of knowledge workers. In Column (2),
it is the set of firms with an above-median R&D intensity. In Column (3), it is the set of firms in knowledge
industries. State-year fixed effects absorb the treated*post indicator. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the state level. Industry is 4-digit NAICS.
I
K it
= α+ β{treatedi ∗ postt ∗ subsamplei}+ γi + θjt + λst + it
(1) (2)
I/K I/K
Treated*Post*Knowledge Firm 0.0560*
(0.0297)
Treated*Post*High R&D Intensity 0.0460*
(0.0245)
State-Year FE Y Y
Industry-Year FE Y Y
Company FE Y Y
Observations 5,030 5,029
R-squared 0.626 0.624
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12: Departures to Entrepreneurship With State-Year FE
The dependent variable is the number of departures from a given firm to newly-founded companies. In
Column (1), this includes only companies with 10 or fewer employees. In Column (2), this expands to
companies with 50 or fewer employees, and in Column (3) this includes newly-founded companies of any
size. Knowledge Firm is an indicator for firms with a higher than median fraction of knowledge workers.
State-year fixed effects absorb the treated*post indicator. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Industry is 4-digit NAICS.
departuresit = α+ β{treatedi ∗ postt ∗ knowledge firmi}+ γi + θjt + λst + it
(1) (2) (3)
New ≤ 10 Employees New ≤ 50 Employees New All Sizes
Treated*Post*Knowledge Firm -0.293** -0.577* -16.53
(0.109) (0.307) (16.65)
State-Year FE Y Y Y
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y
Company FE Y Y Y
Observations 9,785 9,785 9,785
R-squared 0.917 0.926 0.405
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: New Firm Entry With State-Year FE
The dependent variable is the number of companies founded within an industry-state-year, scaled by the
state’s population in millions. In Column (1), this includes only companies with 10 or fewer employees. In
Column (2), this expands to companies with 50 or fewer employees, and in Column (3) this includes newly-
founded companies of any size. Knowledge sector is an indicator for firms in the following three sectors:
professional, scientific and technical services, technology, and education. State-year fixed effects absorb
the treated*post indicator. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Industry is LinkedIn-defined
industry.
firms founded
million people sjt
= α+ β1{treateds ∗ postt ∗ knowledge sectorj}+ γsj + θjt + sjt
(1) (2) (3)
New ≤ 10 Employees New ≤ 50 Employees New All Sizes
Treated*Post*Knowledge Sectors -0.0323 -0.0589** -0.0626**
(0.0203) (0.0251) (0.0265)
State-Year FE Y Y Y
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y
Industry-State FE Y Y Y
Observations 31,850 31,850 31,850
R-squared 0.720 0.772 0.773
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Net Investment With Size Trends
The dependent variable is net investment scaled by one year-lagged net capital. In each column, the regres-
sion is a difference-in-difference-in-differences, or triple differences. In Panel A, the interaction subsample
is knowledge firms. In Panel B, it is high R&D intensity firms. I allow for differential trends by market
capitalization in Column (1); by asset size in Column (2); by employee size in Column (3); and by I/K level
in Column (4). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. Industry is 4-digit NAICS.
I
K it
= α+ β1{treatedi ∗ postt}+ β2{treatedi ∗ postt ∗ subsamplei}+ γi + θjt + it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I/K I/K I/K I/K
Panel A: Knowledge Firms
Treated*Post*Knowledge Firm 0.0910** 0.0871** 0.0836** 0.0871**
(0.0348) (0.0363) (0.0338) (0.0336)
Treated*Post 0.0141 0.0161 0.0168 0.0168
(0.0221) (0.0226) (0.0234) (0.0236)
Observable-Year FE Market Cap. Assets Employees I/K
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Company FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 5,030 5,030 5,030 5,030
R-squared 0.642 0.642 0.643 0.644
Panel B: High R&D Intensity Firms
Treated*Post*High R&D Firm 0.0538* 0.0528* 0.0501* 0.0538*
(0.0283) (0.0278) (0.0279) (0.0292)
Treated*Post 0.0250 0.0258 0.0272 0.0260
(0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0263) (0.0273)
Observable-Year FE Market Cap. Assets Employees I/K
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Company FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 5,029 5,029 5,029 5,029
R-squared 0.621 0.621 0.621 0.623
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 15: Departure Rate by Years to CNC Change
The dependent variable is the firm’s departure rate in year t in percentage points (1 to 100). In Column
(1), the numerator is all departures. In Column (2), the numerator includes only departures where the
origin and destination industries are the same. In Column (3), the numerator includes only departures
from knowledge occupations. In Column (4), the numerator includes only departures to a more senior
position. The denominator is the same throughout, so each outcome variable has a different baseline average
– mechanically, the number is highest in Column (1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
state level. Industry is 4-digit NAICS.
100 ∗ # departures
# employees it
= α+
∑
k
βk{treatedi ∗ k years to treatment}+ γi + θjt + it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Departure
Rate
Knowledge
Workers
Within-
Industry
To More
Senior Job
Within-Ind.
More Senior
Treated*Post*t-1 0.551 0.363 0.513 -0.106 0.0626
(0.936) (0.595) (0.452) (0.333) (0.117)
Treated*Post*t+0 -0.312 -0.409 -0.390 -0.252 -0.0190
(1.244) (0.530) (0.352) (0.389) (0.128)
Treated*Post*t+1 -3.680** -1.779** -1.085** -1.217*** -0.386***
(1.410) (0.676) (0.417) (0.428) (0.137)
Treated*Post*t+2 -3.593** -1.553* -0.992 -1.359** -0.409**
(1.720) (0.850) (0.637) (0.546) (0.153)
Treated*Post*t3+ -4.225*** -1.972*** -1.171** -1.395*** -0.526***
(1.508) (0.621) (0.528) (0.358) (0.110)
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Company FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 9,479 9,479 9,479 9,479 9,479
R-squared 0.964 0.963 0.974 0.940 0.975
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16: I/K by Years to CNC Change
The dependent variable is net investment scaled by one year-lagged net capital. The regression is a triple
difference regression interacting the treated*subsample indicator with years to treatment. In Column (1),
the subsample is the set of firms which employ an above-median fraction of knowledge workers. In Column
(2), it is the set of firms with an above-median R&D intensity. In Column (3), it is the set of firms in
knowledge industries. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. Industry is 4-digit
NAICS.
I
K it
= α+ β1{treatedi ∗ postt}+
∑
k
βk{treatedi ∗ subsamplei ∗ k years to treatment}+ γi + θjt + it
(1) (2) (3)
I/K I/K I/K
Treated*Post*Subsample*t-1 -0.0382 -0.0671 -0.0335
(0.0243) (0.0424) (0.0302)
Treated*Post*Subsample*t+0 0.0372 0.0718 0.0358
(0.0353) (0.0628) (0.0395)
Treated*Post*Subsample*t+1 0.0604* 0.100* 0.0546**
(0.0336) (0.0553) (0.0253)
Treated*Post*Subsample*t+2 0.0779** 0.0475 0.0665*
(0.0296) (0.0289) (0.0358)
Treated*Post*Subsample*t3+ 0.0419* 0.0838 0.0538
(0.0238) (0.0537) (0.0466)
Treated*Post N Y Y
Industry-Year FE Y N N
Subsample-Industry-Year FE N Y Y
Company FE Y Y Y
Observations 5,053 5,030 5,029
R-squared 0.604 0.642 0.621
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17: Departures to Entrepreneurship by Years to CNC Change
The dependent variable is the number of departures from a given firm to newly-founded companies. The
regression is a triple difference regression interacting the treated*knowledge firm indicator with years to
treatment. In Column (1), this includes only companies with 10 or fewer employees. In Column (2), this
expands to companies with 50 or fewer employees, and in Column (3) this includes newly-founded companies
of any size. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Industry is 4-digit NAICS.
departuresit = α+
∑
k
βk{treatedi ∗ knowledge firmi ∗ k years to treatment}+ β2{treatedi ∗ postt}+ γi + θjt + it
(1) (2) (3)
New ≤ 10 Employees New ≤ 50 Employees New All Sizes
Treated*Post*Knowledge Firm*t-1 -0.0230 -0.182 0.320
(0.210) (0.191) (0.607)
Treated*Post*Knowledge Firm*t+0 -0.131 -0.352 -9.494
(0.244) (0.280) (8.514)
Treated*Post*Knowledge Firm*t+1 -0.183 -0.515** -9.813*
(0.258) (0.214) (5.435)
Treated*Post*Knowledge Firm*t+2 -0.101 -0.391* -7.718*
(0.215) (0.216) (4.352)
Treated*Post*Knowledge Firm*t3+ -0.328* -0.735*** -9.663
(0.183) (0.233) (7.238)
Treated*Post Y Y Y
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y
Company FE Y Y Y
Observations 9,785 9,785 9,785
R-squared 0.915 0.924 0.390
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18: New Firm Entry by Years to CNC Change
The dependent variable is the number of companies founded within an industry-state-year, scaled by
the state’s population in millions. The regression is a triple difference regression interacting the
treated*knowledge sector indicator with years to treatment. In Column (1), this includes only compa-
nies with 10 or fewer employees. In Column (2), this expands to companies with 50 or fewer employees,
and in Column (3) this includes newly-founded companies of any size. Knowledge sector is an indicator for
firms in the following three sectors: professional, scientific and technical services, technology, and education.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Industry is LinkedIn-defined industry.
firms founded
million people sjt
= α+
∑
k
βk{treatedi ∗ knowledge sectori ∗ k years to treatment}
+β2{treateds ∗ postt}+ γsj + θjt + sjt
(1) (2) (3)
New ≤ 10 Employees New ≤ 50 Employees New All Sizes
Treated*Knowledge Sector*t-1 0.0121 -0.000938 -0.00107
(0.0316) (0.0327) (0.0334)
Treated*Knowledge Sector*t+0 -0.0301 -0.0529** -0.0570**
(0.0213) (0.0247) (0.0261)
Treated*Knowledge Sector*t+1 -0.0134 -0.0473 -0.0480
(0.0226) (0.0297) (0.0301)
Treated*Knowledge Sector*t+2 -0.0371 -0.0827** -0.0880**
(0.0273) (0.0357) (0.0359)
Treated*Knowledge Sector*t3+ -0.0484 -0.0872 -0.0894
(0.0506) (0.0597) (0.0605)
Treated*Post Y Y Y
Industry-State FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Observations 31,850 31,850 31,850
R-squared 0.690 0.743 0.745
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER 2 : GOODWILL HUNTING: CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AS AN INVESTMENT
2.1. Introduction
At least ninety-five percent of the 250 largest companies in the world report engaging in some
form of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).1 Many of these firms spend large amounts
of money on CSR: Disney spent $248.5 million on CSR in 2012 and Microsoft $904 million,
according to the Reputation Institute, a reputation management consultancy.2 Despite this
significant investment on behalf of firms, there is little consensus on the link between CSR
activity and financial outcomes.
Two schools of thought dominate the debate on the relationship between CSR and firms’
financial interests. The first and arguably most popular is that firms can “do well by
doing good.” This is touted by businesses that conduct CSR and beneficiaries of CSR
(e.g., consumers, activists, communities), but also argued by many in the management
literature (see Margolis et al. (2007) for an overview). The second school of thought,
famously championed by Milton Friedman, is that CSR is at best a distraction from a
firm’s main purpose and at worst a way for managers to use other people’s money toward
their personal projects.3 This position tends to be supported, though not exclusively, in
the finance literature (see for example the recent study by Cheng et al. (2013)).
Critics of the “doing well by doing good” argument point to the lack of solid empirical
evidence to support a causal relationship. A related problem is that the rationale underlying
the argument is vague. Theories include consumers’ willingness to pay more for ethical
products; the lower cost of sustainable practices in the long run; and the importance of
company ethos in attracting and retaining talent. Few empirical studies attempt to clarify
1KPMG, 2011. “International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting.”
2PR News, January 30, 2011. “How Much the Most Reputable Companies Spend on CSR.” Figures are
also available from Microsoft and Disney’s own Citizenship Reports.
3The New York Times Magazine, September 13 1970, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase
its Profits”
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the mechanism through which the relationship operates. While it is certainly possible to
have multiple mechanisms at play, this ambiguity makes it more difficult to feel confident
about the causality of the relationship.
On the other hand, proponents of a neutral or negative impact of CSR have a clear mech-
anism to explain its popularity: agency theory. According to this theory, managers engage
in CSR to satisfy some private benefit, not internalizing the costs that befall shareholders.
Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that manager interest is an important factor for com-
panies engaging in CSR.4 Nonetheless, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory in that
managers do not appear to hide their CSR engagement from shareholders, which we might
expect if CSR activities constituted an expropriation of shareholders for the private benefit
of management. On the contrary, managers tend to be very public about their CSR efforts.
In this paper, I investigate a specific mechanism through which CSR may benefit firms,
which can also explain why managers are so public about it. Specifically, I argue that a
firm’s socially responsible behavior helps it to accumulate goodwill in its community. If
the firm finds itself in a situation where it requires public approval, e.g. when applying for
public contracts, it may draw down on this goodwill for preferential treatment. Interviews
with managers suggest they view this goodwill benefit of CSR as an important motivation
for engaging in social responsibility.5
To address concerns about omitted variables and reverse causality, I propose a new empiri-
cal approach using the staggered passage of state laws as a natural experiment that lowered
constraints on directors’ ability to engage in non-shareholder-oriented policies. These laws,
called Other Constituency (OC) laws, allow directors to consider the interests of stakehold-
ers other than shareholders. In other words, they allow directors to be responsible to society
beyond shareholders. The passage of these laws provides a good setting for studying CSR
for two reasons. First, the laws are explicitly designed to protect directors who consider
4Forbes, October 17, 2012. “The Six Reasons Why Companies Actually Wind Up Embracing CSR.”
5Financial Times, June 22 2011, “License to Operate: Goodwill May Be Key to Gaining Green Light.”
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other stakeholder interests, so they should encourage more of this behavior. Second, there
is no evidence that these laws were anticipated or otherwise enacted in states that were
following a different economic trend than non-OC states. This allows us to plausibly at-
tribute differences in firm outcomes after the laws’ passage (relative to the same differences
pre-passage) to the change in law.
I first document that OC laws led to an increase in socially responsible behavior by looking
at employee safety and health. The motivation for this definition of social responsibility is
twofold: employees are an important stakeholder for all firms, and the data are available
during the time most OC laws pass, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I obtain records on in-
spections and violations from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
and show that following the passage of OC laws, firms had fewer violations, complaints,
and accidents in the workplace. To be clear, I do not argue that absent the laws, companies
are deliberately harming employees. Rather, I argue that expanded discretion to pursue
pro-employee policies result in even lower violations than expected in a standard place of
business.
Second, I show that the rise in non-shareholder-oriented policies coincides with an increase
in public contract awards. I collect historical federal contracts via the National Archives
and find that following the passage of OC laws, firms incorporated in those states are
disproportionately likely to obtain public contracts and contracts of greater value.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on CSR by documenting a specific mech-
anism through which CSR benefits firms, and by proposing a new empirical approach to
address well-documented omitted variable (McGuire et al., 1988; McWilliams and Siegel,
2000; Margolis et al., 2007) and reverse causality (McGuire et al., 1988; Hong et al., 2012)
concerns in understanding the relationship between CSR and firm outcomes.
By doing so it complements the recent work of Hong and Liskovich (2014) and Albuquerque
et al. (2012), who each consider alternative settings in which CSR may benefit firms, and of
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Cheng et al. (2013) who argue that managers engage in pro-stakeholder policy for private
enjoyment. While others (e.g. Hong and Liskovich (2014)) provide suggestive evidence that
good corporate citizens benefit from lower penalties, there has been less empirical research
to show that they are also more likely to obtain awards. This work also connects with
a long-standing literature documenting the relationship between social performance and
economic performance (Margolis et al., 2007).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the data used in
the analysis and descriptive statistics, section 2.3 outlines the empirical approach, section
2.4 presents the main results and section 2.5 discusses the robustness of these results.
2.2. Data
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether changes in socially responsible behavior
are associated with variation in public goodwill. As such, there are three components to
measure empirically: shocks to socially responsible behavior, socially responsible behavior
itself, and public goodwill. For shocks to socially responsible behavior, I use the staggered
passage of state laws that expand directors’ prerogative to pursue stakeholder-friendly poli-
cies. To measure socially responsible behavior, I look at workplace characteristics from
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and later an index from the
Kinder, Lydenburg, Domini & Co (KLD) database covering additional CSR categories. Fi-
nally to measure public goodwill, I use data on government contract awards. The data
sources and sample are described below.
2.2.1. Other Constituency laws and state of incorporation
For data on OC laws, I rely largely on a previous paper (Geczy et al., 2015) that reviews
state legislative session documents to verify the correct passage dates of the laws. Table
19 contains a list of all relevant laws and passage years. States marked with an asterisk
have laws that apply only in takeover contexts. Results reported in section 2.4 are robust
to excluding the states which pass these laws. For an in-depth review of the laws, including
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a review of the language and a history of cases citing the laws, see Geczy et al. (2015).
Firms are subject to OC laws if they are incorporated in a state which has such a law. As
a result, it is important to properly identify the state of incorporation. To do this I use
the data assembled by Gormley and Matsa (2014). These data track the historical state of
incorporation through 2006, after which I use state of incorporation from Compustat when
necessary.
2.2.2. Measures of corporate social responsibility
CSR is “generally understood as being the way through which a company achieves a balance
of economic, environmental and social imperatives... while at the same time addressing the
expectations of shareholders and stakeholders.”6 Below are ways in which I capture firms’
CSR.
Employee safety and health
A broad index of CSR is not available during the main period when legislatures pass OC
laws (1987-1990). To verify the effect of the law’s passage, I first focus in on a specific
category of stakeholders for which I can observe strengths and concerns within the same
time period: employees.
I collect workplace safety inspection and violation records from the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), the US federal agency responsible for monitoring workplace
safety.7 Table 20 provides an overview of the variables I collect as well as summary statistics
for my sample.
OSHA has jurisdiction over almost all non-governmental U.S. workers.8 Inspections are
6Definition from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization,
http://www.unido.org/en/what-we-do/trade/csr/what-is-csr.html
7I obtain detailed inspection and violation data on OSHA from the Department of Labor’s online data
catalog available at http://ogesdw.dol.gov/views/data catalogs.php
8Those not covered by OSHA include self-employed workers, immediate family mem-
bers, farm employers, and workers whose hazards are regulated by another federal agency
https://www.osha.gov/OSHA FAQs.html
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always conducted without advance notice, although in special circumstances OSHA may
give a notice of less than 24 hours to the employer.9 While a business can refuse an OSHA
inspection without a warrant, almost none do, as requiring a warrant tends to invite more
scrutiny and result in more citations.10
Alternative measure: KLD database
In section 2.5 I use the Kinder, Lydenburg, Domini & Co (KLD) index as an alternative
measure of CSR to test the robustness of my results to alternative specifications. The KLD
index is arguably the most widely used tool for measuring CSR. However, KLD only begins
tracking companies in 1991, which is too late to compare pre- and post-law levels for my
sample. As a result in section 2.5 I examine cross-sectional differences between OC and
non-OC states.
KLD scans public databases and news reports to track company strengths and concerns
along multiple dimensions of CSR. For the purpose of this paper I focus on five categories
of CSR: community, diversity, employee, environment and product. Each category is broken
down further into strengths and concerns that are coded as 1 (for presence of trait) or 0
(for absence). For example, the community category includes charitable giving, support for
housing, support for education and volunteer programs as strength traits. Concern traits
include investment controversies, negative economic impact and tax disputes. Following
Cheng et al. (2013), I construct an annual aggregate CSR score for each firm by adding the
firm’s strengths and subtracting its concerns across all five categories. Table 21 provides
summary statistics for these data.
9OSHA may also inspect businesses at random, but the agency typically prioritizes sit-
uations of imminent dangers, accident investigations, and complaints or referrals. See
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha2098.pdf
10http://www.pedersenhoupt.com/newsroom-publications-46.html
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2.2.3. Government Contracts
To proxy for public goodwill, I look at public contract awards. The data I collect come
from Department of Defense contract records kept by the National Archives. The Depart-
ment of Defense is the single largest contractor within the U.S. government, with contracts
representing a wide variety of product markets and suppliers, from food to services to manu-
facturing parts. These records are available as undelimited text files, and require substantial
work to read in and clean. For parsimony, I focused on the ten most important years of
data, 1984-1993, which covers 29 of the 33 laws passed.
I match these data to Compustat using fuzzy matching on names and other available in-
formation. I expect some observations from the contract data not to match to Compustat
(contracts associated with private companies) and some observations from Compustat not
to match to the contract data (public companies without a contracting relationship with
the government). However, it is also likely that I am losing some observations. Because I
consider the lack of a contract to be relevant information, I keep observations from Com-
pustat which do not match to the contract data, setting the number of contracts and total
contracting dollars for these firms to zero. As long as there is no systematic bias in my
matching algorithm, that is, as long as unmatched firms are no more or less likely to be
incorporated in states that pass OC laws, this should only widen my standard errors but
not bias my results. My final sample contains 61,498 firm-year level observations, of which
4,675 (or about 8%) indicate one or more contracts were signed for that firm in that year.
Table 22 shows summary statistics for contracts in my sample. Since the outcomes are right-
skewed, I use a log transformation in regressions. In order to keep observations with zero
contracts, I add one to contract dollars and number before taking the log when considering
the full sample.
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2.3. Empirical Approach
I wish to test whether an increase in CSR will be followed by greater propensity to benefit
from awards that depend on public approval. An important criticism of existing research on
CSR is that studies fail to account for potential correlation between CSR and unobserved
variables that also affect performance. Reverse causality is another concern: firms that do
better may have more resources to spend on CSR.
To address these issues, I propose a novel approach that uses the staggered passage of
state laws that relaxed constraints on directors’ ability to engage in stakeholder-friendly
policies. Specifically these laws, known as Other Constituency (OC) laws, allow directors
to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituents when making decisions for the firm.
An example of the statutes’ language is in the appendix. The laws pass in 33 states over a
wide range of time, though concentrated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I provide more
context for the passage and meaningfulness of the laws later in this section when discussing
the underlying assumptions.
2.3.1. Specification
The main specification is as follows.
yit = β0 + β1OCjt ∗ post+ β2BCjt ∗ post+ β3xit + it (2.1)
where yit is the firm outcome (e.g., number of government contracts awarded), xit are control
variables including industry-year and state of incorporation fixed effects (which absorb
the traditional difference-in-differences indicators “Treated” and “Post”), OCjt ∗ post is an
indicator that turns on once a firm’s state of incorporation has passed an Other Constituency
law and similarly BCjt∗post is an indicator that turns on once a firm’s state of incorporation
has passed a Business Combination law. I control for BC laws throughout because they are
laws that pass around the same time and have been documented to affect firm outcomes.11
11BC laws are the main other director-oriented laws passed around the same time as OC laws.
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I also control for size as defined by the number of employees and total assets of the firm. In
tabulated results I allow employee and asset controls to vary over time, because they do not
appear to be affected by OC laws and because restricting them to 1984 values unnecessarily
decreases the sample size. However, results are qualitatively similar when using 1984 values.
I define industry as the four-digit SIC code. Standard errors are clustered at the state of
incorporation to account for serial correlation as well as cross-sectional correlation in the
state of incorporation. I estimate this equation using OLS.
For outcome variables that capture public goodwill, I use the attribution of federal govern-
ment contracts. The underlying assumption is that governments have an incentive to reflect
the preferences of their voters. In theory, as a representative of the public, the government
should reflect constituents’ preferences. More practically, the government is likely to be
concerned about associating with good corporate citizens (and not associating with bad
corporate citizens) for the purpose of being reelected. Anecdotal evidence supports this
assumption. The U.S. government has previously stated similar preference mechanisms,
such as favoring veteran- and minority-owned businesses. Such contracts do not appear in
my analysis, which only considers publicly-owned businesses, but indicate a willingness to
consider the social impact of companies in attributing contracts. Local governments have
often aligned themselves with local sentiment in opposing relationships with “bad corporate
citizens” such as Walmart and Monsanto.12,13 Finally, other national government such as
Italy and the United Kingdom have put in place formal preferences for socially responsi-
ble firms, suggesting governments can reflect constituents in caring about corporate social
responsibility practices.
2.3.2. Relevance
An important assumption underpinning this natural experiment approach is that OC laws
were relevant to companies’ social responsibility. CSR can be defined as a company’s prac-
12Newsday, June 5 2014, “De Blasio: Walmart Unwelcome in New York City.”
13Joc.com, July 7 1992, “For Monsanto, It’s No Fun Trying to Open a Plant that No One Wants.”
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tice of ensuring the well-being of its non-shareholder stakeholders. These other stakeholders
– or other constituents – are typically defined as including community, employees, consumers
and environment. Indeed, these are key categories of constituents tracked by the KLD Index.
In the main results of this paper, I focus on a particular class of constituents: employees.
As illustrated in the language of the Pennsylvania statute provided in the appendix, OC
laws are designed to protect directors engaging in policies oriented toward these other
stakeholders. The language typically provides directors with broad discretion to pursue a
social agenda. According to Carney and Shepherd (2008) “[these] states effectively give
directors carte blanche discretion by allowing them to consider other constituencies.”
However, laws sometimes stand on the books without being used, or are interpreted in
ways that set precedents potentially different from the original intent. Geczy et al. (2015)
construct a history of cases citing OC laws in the years since they were passed and review the
ways in which the laws were enforced. The authors find 47 relevant cases, of which 21 cases
address the expansion of directors’ rights to consider non-shareholder interests. (Other
cases address the standing of other constituents to require consideration by directors –
typically not recognized – or cite to the statutes without directly addressing the expansion
of directors’ rights.) Out of these 21 cases, 17 affirm the expansion of directors’ rights,
while 4 decline to recognize expanded authority. The number of cases is not large, but it is
enough to indicate that courts recognized the presence of the laws. Moreover, shareholders
and directors often reach agreement before taking matters to court, which would not show up
in case records. The authors conclude that the laws were largely implemented as intended.
Even if the laws are not misconstrued or forgotten, they may not have much impact on
firms’ behavior. To address this, I use employee safety and health as a measure of social
responsibility. Employees are an important category of stakeholders, one of the categories
specifically tracked by KLD. I consider a range of variables pertaining to firms’ behavior
toward employees: I first look at number of violations, number of serious violations, and
number of instances a violation was found (e.g., whether the violation appears to be a one-
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time omission or systematic). Since labeling an infraction as a violation may be subjective, I
also look at measures of firms’ behavior which are not subject to inspector discretion, such as
number of complaints received about the firm, number of instances a hazardous substance
was found, and number of accidents. In section 2.4.1, I show that all of these measures
decline after passage of the laws, suggesting companies improved their policies. To be
clear, I do not argue that absent the laws, companies are deliberately harming employees.
Instead I argue that expanded discretion to pursue pro-employee policies results in even
lower violations than expected in a standard place of business. In section 2.5.1, I also verify
that being incorporated in a state with an OC law is predictive of a higher KLD score.
2.3.3. Parallel Trends
The second main assumption underlying this natural experiment is that firms incorporated
in different states are experiencing relatively similar trends prior to the passage of the
law and would have continued to experience similar trends but for the passage of the laws.
Table 2.6 provides summary statistics of firm characteristics for both groups of observations
as of 1984 (before most laws pass). There are no statistically significant differences between
the two groups.
Many states passed these laws as a response to rulings that favored shareholder primacy
over other constituents,14 with the intent that companies be responsible to their other
constituents, making the timing of the law plausibly exogenous.
2.4. Results
I first use OSHA outcomes as a proxy for CSR to verify that OC laws have an impact on CSR.
Across the board, violations and other measures of bad behavior appear to decline. These
results are consistent across a number of specifications, including controls for employees,
assets, and firm fixed effects.
I then use government contract awards as a proxy for public goodwill and find that these
14See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (Del. 1986)
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awards increase following the passage of OC laws. Again, results are consistent across a
number of specifications, and I discuss robustness in section 2.5.
2.4.1. Workplace Safety Violations and Complaints
Table 24 presents the results of the difference-in-differences specification from section 2.3.1
with measures of employee environment quality as the dependent variables. In Panel A, I
consider whether violations declined following the passage of OC laws. The coefficient esti-
mates suggests that the presence of an OC law resulted in 0.223 fewer violations, 0.560 fewer
instances of violations and 0.0843 fewer serious violations for the average firm incorporated
in the state. These numbers are small because most firms have zero violations – relative to
the averages reported in Table 20, the estimates appear relatively large, at 20-25% of aver-
age levels (for violations the estimate represents 24% of an average level of 0.94, for number
of instances 23% of an average of 2.43 and for serious violations 23% of an average of 0.40).
One reason for the size of these estimates may be the skewness of the outcome variables.
Since I want to consider firms that go from having some violations to zero violations, I
include all firms incorporated in the state, including ones with zero violations.
Panel B presents the results of the regression analysis for other behavior outcomes. The
coefficient estimates suggest that following the passage of OC laws, firms have 0.0266 fewer
complaints, 0.0167 fewer instances of hazardous substance found, and 0.00530 fewer acci-
dents. Again, for complaints and accidents, the effect is proportionally similar, with the
estimated decline in complaints representing 24% of an average of 0.11 and the estimated
decline in accidents representing 27% of an average of 0.02. For hazardous substances, the
magnitude of the coefficient suggests a larger effect, representing 56% of the average of 0.03.
Relative to standard deviations, coefficient estimates in both panels hover around 1-3% of
standard deviation, again pointing to the large variation in the distribution of outcomes.
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Government Contracts
Table 25 presents estimates of the difference-in-differences with ln(1 + contracting dollars)
as the dependent variable. The log transformation brings the distribution closer to a nor-
mal distribution, while adding one allows me to keep observations with zero contracting
relationship, which are important for this analysis.
The use of this transformation means that the interpretation of estimates depends on the
level of the dependent variable. Given an average contracting dollar amount of 19,439 (in
thousands of USD), the estimates in Table 25 suggest an increase in government contract
amounts of 6-7% for the average observation following the passage of OC laws. Note that
as the dependent variable decreases, the percentage increase implied by the estimate rises
at the rate of 1+yy , where y is the dependent variable. As a result the estimate is harder to
interpret for observations with zero contracts. Nonetheless, this analysis reveals a robust
positive relationship between contracts obtained from the government and the presence of
OC laws.
To dig into the drivers of this relationship, I look at whether firms had more contracts
approved or more valuable contracts. Table 26 presents the results of the same estimation
as above, but with ln(1 + number of contracts) as the dependent variable. Estimates of
the coefficient on the presence of an OC law are positive, but only statistically significant
above a 90% confidence threshold in the last specification when clustering standard errors
at the state of incorporation.15 As with the previous specification, the interpretation of the
magnitude of the coefficient depends on the level of the variable. The estimates suggest an
increase in the number of contracts awarded of 2% for the average observation.
Finally, I look at the average value of contracts. The dependent variable in Table 27
is ln(mboxdollars per contract). The sample universe for this regression is substantially
smaller since it include only firms with one or more government contracts. Nevertheless,
15If clustered at the firm level, estimates throughout are statistically significant, but this does not allow
for cross-correlation across firms incorporated in the same state.
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controlling for size (by employees) the estimates suggest an increase in value per contract
of 10-13% that is significant above a 95% confidence level.
2.5. Robustness and discussion
2.5.1. Instrumental variable approach in later sample (2000-2009)
One of the drawbacks of the difference-in-differences approach is that there are limited
options to measure CSR and government contracts in the 1984-1993 period. Starting in
2000, usaspending.gov tracks all government contracts (not just Department of Defense
contracts), and more detailed CSR data are available from the KLD index. To verify that
results hold when using these measures of government contracts and CSR, I conduct an
instrumental variable analysis. In this analysis, incorporation in a state with an OC law is
an instrument for CSR, where CSR is measured by the KLD score.
In a naive OLS regression of contract outcomes on KLD score, contract outcomes appear to
be strongly positively related with CSR (KLD) score, even when controlling for profitability
and size. The magnitudes implied by the regression are large: 2% greater probability of
having any contract, 13% more contracts, and 37% more contracting dollars for the average
observation. Most importantly, the regressions support a positive relationship even when
looking at a different measure of contracts and CSR.
Next, I employ a two-stage least-squares approach to analyze the relationship between CSR
and public contracts, with incorporation in an OC state as an instrument for CSR score.
Results are shown in Table 29. In the first stage, presence of an OC law is associated with
a 0.210 higher KLD score, or about 10% of a standard deviation in the KLD score. Results
from the second stage show a positive and statistically significant relationship between
CSR score and contract outcomes. The implied magnitudes of the effect of incorporation
in an OC state are again large: 0.4% greater probability of having any contract, 28% more
contracts (12% at the lower bound), and 255% more contracting dollars for the average
observation (44% at the lower bound). The magnitude of the latter is perhaps implausibly
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large. Nonetheless, in this alternative setting we again observe a positive and statistically
significant relationship.
2.5.2. Alternative interpretations
A potential alternative explanation for the results described in this paper is that companies
use CSR and OC laws as a means of lobbying politicians. An example of this would
be a company spending money to renovate a park in a politician’s neighborhood, rather
than renovating a park in a less well-connected, low-income neighborhood. The two can
be hard to disentangle, but the fact that OC laws are associated with more pro-employee
behavior suggests there is more at play than catering only to politicians’ private preferences.
In untabulated results, I verify that OC laws are positively correlated with all five KLD
categories, providing further support that companies are engaging in CSR activities that
are unlikely to benefit politicians only (e.g., diversity). Nonetheless, it is possible that while
companies are engaging in both types of behavior, it is only the behavior which benefits
politicians directly that results in more public contracts. One way to test for this would be
to control for companies’ spending on political campaigns as a proxy for their propensity
to lobby politicians. Another would be to compare companies with similar CSR levels but
different levels of public reputation for CSR. If the channel is public goodwill, companies
with better public reputation all else equal should be more likely to reap benefits. At this
stage, these analyses are beyond the scope of the paper, but deserve attention in the future.
Finally, I look at federal contracts, which should be harder to lobby (at least via CSR) than
local contracts.
Another possible interpretation is that OC laws have other effects beyond permitting com-
panies to engage in more stakeholder-friendly policies, and it is these other effects which
are leading to more public contracts. For example, several OC laws were passed in the
same period as takeover protection legislation. If takeover protection leads to more pub-
lic contracts, this could be captured by coefficients in the difference-in-differences analysis.
However, I control for the presence of BC laws throughout the difference-in-differences anal-
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ysis (BC laws are direct anti-takeover laws passed in the same time period), and these laws
appear to have the opposite relationship not only with contracting outcomes but also with
employee environment outcomes. Moreover, section 2.5.1 provides supporting evidence that
the relationship moves at least in part through the level of CSR.
The results of the analysis bring up a larger question: if CSR is a profitable venture, why
don’t all companies do it? After all, profitable business strategies should be protected in
all states via business judgment rules. Albuquerque et al. (2012) provide a model in which
CSR engagement is not equally costly for all firms, so that even though there is some benefit
from CSR, firms will not all make the same choice. Another way to view this is that it
takes only one disgruntled shareholder to threaten litigation which is reputationally costly
for a director. If OC laws reduce the standing of a director to bring such a complaint, they
reduce the cost of engaging in CSR. We would thus expect different levels of CSR across
firms, and a correlation between OC laws and CSR, as we observe. Moreover, as with other
types of investment, directors may have different beliefs about the expected benefit or risk
of CSR. This would also lead to cross-sectional variation in the appetite for CSR.
2.6. Conclusion
Corporate social responsibility has an increasingly important and public place in firms’
activities. Among firm managers, the consensus appears to be that doing good is good for
business. Yet the literature has failed to provide a compelling – and empirically convincing
– explanation for this phenomenon. In this paper, I explored the possibility that CSR is an
investment in public goodwill, where goodwill is attractive to companies because it increases
their chances of obtaining awards or approval from the public, among other benefits.
To address omitted variable and reverse causality concerns in the relationship between
CSR and firm outcomes, I employ a novel identification strategy that uses the staggered
passage of state constituency laws (OC laws) as a natural experiment for improved CSR.
OC laws, passed mainly in the 1980s and early 1990s, provide protection for directors
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wishing to pursue stakeholder-friendly policies, such as pro-environment, pro-community,
pro-employee policies that are an important part of CSR.
In this setting, I show that increases in CSR are accompanied by increases in public awards in
the form of government contracts. I first document that OC laws have a positive impact on
CSR, by showing that employee environment systematically improves following the passage
of the laws. In later years when the measure becomes available, the presence of an OC law
is also positively related to a broad index of CSR. Concurrently, firms obtain more public
contracts and more money from public contracts following the passage of the laws.
The contribution of this paper is to explore a specific channel through which socially re-
sponsible behavior can benefit companies: accumulating public goodwill. This does not
preclude the existence of other channels. Future work should address alternative channels,
such as ability to attract and retain talent, in particular in more recent years.
62
Table 19: Constituency Statutes by Year
State Statute Passage Year
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §10-2702 1987
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. §33-756(d) 1988
Florida Fla. Stat. §607.0830(3) 1989
Georgia O.C.G.A. §14-2-202(b)(5) 1989
Hawaii HRS §414-221(b) 1989
Idaho Idaho Code §30-1602; §30-1702 1988
Illinois 805 ILCS 5/8.85 1985
Indiana Burns Ind. Code Ann. §23-1-35-1(d) 1986
Iowa* I.C.A. §491.101B 1989
Kentucky* KRS §271B.12-210(4) 1988
Louisiana* La. Rev. Stat. §12:92(G) 1988
Maine* 13-C M.R.S. §831(6) 1985
Maryland MD Corps. & Assoc. §2-104(b)(9) 1999
Massachusetts ALM GL ch. 156D, §8.30(a)(3) 1989
Minnesota Minn. Stat. §302A.251 subd. 5 1987
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. §79-4-8.30(f) 1990
Missouri* Mo. Rev. Stat. §351.347 1986
Nebraska Neb.Rev.St. §21-2095 1988
Nevada NRS 78.138(4) 1991
New Jersey N.J. Stat. §14A:6-1(3) 1989
New Mexico N.M.S.A. §53-11-35(d) 1987
New York NY Bus. Corps. Stat. §717(b) 1989
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code, §10-19.1-50(6) 1993
Ohio Ohio Gen. Corp. Law §1701.59(F) 1984
Oregon* ORS §60.357(5) 1989
Pennsylvania 15 Pa C.S.A. §1715(a)(b) or §516(a) 1983
Rhode Island* R.I. Gen. Laws §7-5.2-8(a) 1990
South Dakota* S.D. Codified Laws §47-33-4(1) 1990
Tennessee* T.C.A. §48-103-204 1988
Texas Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. §21.401 2003
Vermont 11A V.S.A. §8.30(a)(3) 1998
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. §180.0827 1987
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. §17-16-830(g) 1989
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Table 20: OSHA Summary Statistics 1979-2006
N Mean Std. Dev.
Violations 240,722 0.94 7.46
Serious violations 240,722 0.40 3.41
Number of instances 240,722 2.43 35.96
Number exposed 240,722 26.42 487.34
Accidents 240,722 0.02 0.46
Complaints 240,722 0.11 1.29
Hazardous substance violation 240,722 0.03 0.56
Table 21: KLD Summary Statistics (2000-2009)
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Aggregate CSR Score -0.19 2.02 -9 -1 0 1 16
Aggregate CSR Strengths 1.17 1.93 0 0 0 2 21
Aggregate CSR Concerns 1.36 1.56 0 0 1 2 13
Community CSR Score 0.04 0.49 -2 0 0 0 4
Diversity CSR Score 0.23 1.23 -2 -1 0 1 7
Employee CSR Score -0.19 0.85 -4 -1 0 0 5
Environment CSR Score -0.1 0.66 -5 0 0 0 4
Product CSR Score -0.18 0.59 -4 0 0 0 2
Table 22: Government Contract Summary Statistics (1984-1993)
N Mean Std. Dev.
Percent contracted 61,498 8% 27%
Total dollars 61,498 19,439 607,809
Total contracts 61,498 6.51 91.54
Dollars per contract 4,721 2,347 12,964
Table 23: Average firm characteristics as of 1984, OC v. non-OC states
Not Constituency Constituency
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Revenue 4,297.20 14,986.38 3,948.63 15,644.14
Net Income 241.39 1,261.24 273.86 1,606.99
Total Assets 10,563.19 69,818.46 8,356.33 36,763.28
EBITDA 757.23 2,893.59 730.71 3,331.02
Employees (000s) 14.76 62.85 12.29 34.05
All values in $ millions except where otherwise indicated
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Table 24: OSHA Outcomes
Panel A: Violations
Violations Number of instances Serious Violations
OC*Post -0.223*** -0.560** -0.0843**
(0.0735) (0.275) (0.0345)
BC*Post 0.145*** 0.0257 0.100***
(0.0378) (0.312) (0.0272)
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y
State of Incorporation FE Y Y Y
Observations 240,722 240,722 240,722
R squared 0.175 0.123 0.19
Panel B: Other Behaviors
Complaints Hazardous substance found Accidents
OC*Post -0.0266** -0.0167** -0.00530***
(0.0103) (0.00779) (0.00174)
BC*Post 0.0163 0.00168 0.00163
(0.0101) (0.00523) (0.00272)
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y
State of Incorporation FE Y Y Y
Observations 240,722 240,722 240,722
R squared 0.138 0.133 0.102
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Table 25: Total Dollars
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OC*Post 0.0642* 0.0643* 0.0568* 0.0717**
(0.0359) (0.0332) (0.0302) (0.0329)
BC*Post -0.0555* -0.0607* -0.0640** -0.0649**
(0.0292) (0.0303) (0.0298) (0.0303)
Ln(Employees) 0.305*** 0.162***
(0.0151) (0.0139)
Ln(Assets) 0.278*** 0.158***
(0.0163) (0.0195)
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y
State of Incorporation FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 61,498 50,302 55,390 50,297
R-squared 0.141 0.214 0.203 0.216
Table 26: Number of Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OC*Post 0.0180 0.0191 0.0164 0.0214*
(0.0130) (0.0119) (0.0108) (0.0118)
BC*Post -0.0299** -0.0331*** -0.0336*** -0.0345***
(0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0118)
Ln(Employees) 0.102*** 0.0561***
(0.00597) (0.00395)
Ln(Assets) 0.0922*** 0.0507***
(0.00644) (0.00670)
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y
State of Incorporation FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 61,498 50,302 55,390 50,297
R-squared 0.141 0.220 0.208 0.223
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Table 27: Dollars per Contract
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OC*Post 0.0963 0.119** 0.0932 0.121**
(0.0617) (0.0582) (0.0563) (0.0577)
BC*Post -0.0494 -0.0133 -0.0259 -0.0127
(0.0528) (0.0503) (0.0543) (0.0499)
Ln(Emp) 0.143*** 0.165***
(0.0190) (0.0425)
Ln(Assets) 0.128*** -0.0220
(0.0184) (0.0422)
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y
State of Incorporation FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,721 4,569 4,697 4,569
R-squared 0.785 0.805 0.798 0.805
Table 28: Government Contract Awards – OLS Regression with Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Contracted Ln(1 + contracts) Ln(1 + dollars)
CSR Score 0.0162*** 0.120*** 0.308***
(0.00425) (0.0229) (0.0582)
Revenue 5.09e-06*** 3.43e-05*** 8.98e-05***
(6.01e-07) (4.04e-06) (1.09e-05)
Total Assets 4.38e-07** 1.19e-06 5.62e-06
(1.96e-07) (1.18e-06) (3.54e-06)
EBIT -1.31e-06 7.05e-06 4.16e-06
(7.25e-06) (3.47e-05) (0.000123)
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y
Observations 18,011 18,011 17,904
R-squared 0.049 0.105 0.08
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors: clustered at state of incorporation
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Table 29: Government Contract Awards – IV Regression
Panel A: First Stage
(1)
CSR Score
Constituency State 0.210**
(0.0803)
Industry-Year FE Y
Observations 18,199
R-squared 0.002
Panel B: Two Stage Least Squares
(1) (2) (3)
Contracted Ln(1 + contracts) Ln(1 + dollars)
CSR Score 0.179* 0.843** 2.564*
(0.102) (0.405) (1.448)
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y
Observations 18,199 18,199 18,092
R-squared 0.103 0.203 0.189
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at state of incorporation
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APPENDIX
Example Language of OC Law From Pennsylvania
“In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors, committees
of the board and individual directors of a domestic corporation may, in considering the
best interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action upon employees, upon
suppliers and customers of the corporation and upon communities in which offices or other
establishments of the corporation are located, and all other pertinent factors.” (15 Pa.
Cons. Stat. §516(a))
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